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ARTICLE
Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets:
Federal and State Issues
JUSTIN GUNDLACH & ROMANY WEBB
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
New York’s Clean Energy Standard (“CES”), adopted in August 2016, aims to steer the state’s electricity sector away from carbon-intensive generation sources. It supports low-carbon alternatives by requiring retail electricity suppliers to purchase credits, the
proceeds from which are paid to renewable and nuclear generators.
Recognizing that this will affect the operation of wholesale electricity markets, New York’s electric transmission grid operator (the
“New York Independent System Operator” or “NYISO”) has commenced a review to assess possible means of incorporating the cost
of carbon emissions into market prices.
This Article explores two approaches to carbon pricing in
NYISO markets: the first would involve NYISO adopting a carbon
price of its own initiative with a view to improving the operation of
wholesale electricity markets (“Approach 1”), while the second
would involve adoption of a carbon price designed to reflect and
harmonize state-level policies aimed at reducing electricity sector
emissions (“Approach 2”). Under either approach, NYISO would
adopt a per megawatt hour carbon price and use it to establish a fee
for each generating unit, consistent with its emissions profile. This
fee would be added to the prices generators bid into the wholesale
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electricity market and those adjusted prices used by NYISO to determine the dispatch order. The result would likely be a re-ordering
of dispatch, with high-emitting generators dispatched (and paid)
less frequently, and cleaner alternatives more frequently.
Our proposal, while conceptually simple, is likely to be difficult
to implement. Key issues that must be addressed before its adoption
and implementation include:
• Design: NYISO could derive a carbon price from the social
cost of carbon (“SCC”), though this basis would likely be
contentious.
• Ensuring fairness for generators: Whether NYISO derives its carbon price from the SCC or another touchstone,
care must be taken to ensure that it does not duplicate other
carbon pricing schemes. Some generators bidding into
NYISO markets are already subject to carbon pricing
through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),
a cap-and-trade program. The carbon fee may also need to
be adjusted to account for the value of zero-emission credits
paid to nuclear generators under tier 3 of the CES.
• Mitigating consumer impacts: Adoption of a carbon
pricing scheme by NYISO would likely lead to an increase
in wholesale electricity prices, at least in the short term. To
offset this increase, revenues generated through carbon
pricing should be refunded to retail electricity suppliers in
an equitable manner, not tied to their specific purchases.
• Providing legal justification: Any NYISO carbon pricing scheme would be subject to review by FERC. The Federal Power Act confers broad authority on FERC to shape
wholesale electricity markets to ensure that they produce
just and reasonable rates. This paper argues that incorporating a carbon price into wholesale electricity rates—under either Approach 1 or Approach 2—would be just and
reasonable. We acknowledge, however, that Approach 1
would push the boundaries of past market regulation,
though in ways that are consistent with the law and with
FERC practice. Approach 2 would fit more comfortably
within the existing boundaries of FERC’s authority to strike
a balance between respecting state-level public policy and
ensuring the smooth operation of wholesale markets.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1

2

2017]
•

•

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets

3

Arguments supporting Approach 1:
o Enhancing competition in wholesale energy
markets: The current failure to price carbon undermines the competitiveness of wholesale markets and,
more specifically, low-carbon generators’ participation in those markets. Adopting a carbon price, based
on the SCC, would level the playing field for all market participants and would be wholly consistent with
FERC’s past efforts to improve the functioning of
markets.
o Ensuring proper wholesale price formation:
FERC has emphasized that, to provide the correct incentives for investment, wholesale electricity rates
must reflect the full cost of generation. Currently,
however, market-based rates do not reflect the cost of
carbon dioxide emissions and associated climate
change. As the SCC would exceed costs to market participants, its use could not be justified solely by this
argument. Considered in isolation, this argument
would justify a lower carbon price, based on costs to
market participants.
Arguments supporting Approach 2:
o Align wholesale markets with state-level public
policy for the short and long term: New York has
adopted several policies in service to its goal of decarbonizing the electricity sector, including three that
impose disparate prices on a patchwork of generators. It has also articulated long-term targets for
emissions reductions that will not be achieved without the adoption of further specific policy measures.
A carbon pricing scheme that rationalizes existing
public policy and anticipates foreseeable changes to
that policy would respect state authority while also
ensuring that wholesale markets operate efficiently
and send accurate signals to market participants
and investors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As part of its ongoing efforts to combat climate change, New
York has committed to reduce statewide greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions by forty percent below 1990 levels by 2030 (the “40 by 30
goal”).1 The bulk of emissions reductions are expected to come from
the electricity sector, with the state aiming to secure fifty percent
of its electricity needs from zero-emitting renewable generators.2
Consistent with this goal, the state’s Clean Energy Standard
(“CES”) requires retail electricity suppliers (“Load Serving Entities” or “LSEs”) to purchase Renewable Energy Credits (“RECs”),
the proceeds from which will be paid to renewable generators.3 The
CES also requires LSEs to obtain Zero-Emission Credits (“ZECs”),
which compensate nuclear generators for their zero-emission attributes.4
Prompted in part by the adoption of the CES, the New York
Independent System Operator (“NYISO”), a non-profit corporation
which oversees electricity transmission and wholesale sales in New
York, commenced a review in the fall of 2016 to assess whether and
1.
2.
3.
4.

N.Y. STATE ENERGY PLANNING BD., THE ENERGY TO LEAD: 2015 NEW YORK
STATE ENERGY PLAN 112 (2015), https://perma.cc/F2B9-LTF9.
Id.
Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Case No. 15-E-0302 at 14–16
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZJZ8-WX4S [hereinafter NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order].
Id. at 19–20.
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how generators’ GHG emissions should be priced in wholesale electricity markets.5 The Brattle Group was engaged by NYISO to analyze various emissions pricing schemes and published a report
summarizing their likely effects in August 2017.6 Building on that
report, this Article explores two approaches to emissions pricing in
wholesale markets and discusses the legal implications of each.
Wholesale electricity markets have generally treated GHG
emissions as a wholly exogenous externality of generation, to be
addressed—if at all—through environmental policy tools such as
pollution control laws or temporary emerging-market subsidies for
the nascent renewables industry.7 In our view, however, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has authority to approve a NYISO tariff that prices-in emissions insofar as it (a)
merely makes way for or harmonizes public policy at the state level
or (b) can be shown to improve the functioning of wholesale markets to ensure just and reasonable rates. These two legal paths to
emissions pricing are not mutually exclusive, but they are distinct
and would have implications for the approach taken by NYISO.
Both paths are rooted in the authority conferred by the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), which empowers FERC to shape wholesale
electricity markets and steer transmission planning to ensure that
the bulk power system delivers reliable electricity services for just
and reasonable rates.8 Although FERC has not previously relied
on this authority to price GHG emissions, neither the FPA’s capacious language nor the judicial decisions that have interpreted it
prevent such a step. Indeed, as explained below, we read existing
authority as all but commanding that wholesale markets be reconfigured to better account for the costs of emissions.

5.

6.
7.

8.

See generally Shawn Whites, Pricing Carbon in Wholesale Electricity Markets: RTOs/ISOs Looking at a Carbon Price to Integrate Regional Public
Policy Goals, AG SPEAKING ENERGY (Oct. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/TF6BSB78 (discussing the NYISO review).
SAMUEL A. NEWELL ET AL., THE BRATTLE GRP., PRICING CARBON INTO NYISO’S
WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKET TO SUPPORT NEW YORK’S DECARBONIZATION
GOALS (2017), https://perma.cc/QH8S-6X9R.
See Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(“[Potential] siting, health, safety, environmental [or] archeological problems . . . [are] beyond the Commission’s authority to consider under sections
205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act.”).
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (requiring wholesale electricity rates to be just and reasonable).
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The authors recognize that one of our proposed paths to pricing emissions—which would see NYISO adopting an emissions
price of its own initiative with a view to improving the operation of
wholesale electricity markets—would push the boundaries of what
has to date been considered the limit of FERC’s authority. Many
view climate change as an environmental externality whose attendant costs lay beyond the scope of what ought to inform FERC’s
assessment of wholesale rates’ justness and reasonableness.9 We
argue, however, that climate change and the GHG emissions that
cause it materially affect the wholesale energy market. The carbon
pricing scheme we propose would ensure that those effects are
properly accounted for in market prices. The proposal would, like
several other recent orders, enhance competition and improve
price formation. It would also support effective planning.
The fact that the FPA does not expressly authorize emissions
pricing in wholesale markets is not fatal. FERC has, in the past,
taken steps not contemplated in the FPA. The establishment of
wholesale markets is a good example. At the time the FPA was
enacted, electricity services were provided by vertically integrated
utilities.10 Markets evolved gradually over time, as a result of various FERC actions, beginning with the adoption of Order 888 in
1996.11 That order laid the groundwork for competitive energy
markets by requiring utilities to provide “open access” transmission services to unaffiliated generators.12 The order is widely considered a response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which authorized FERC to order individual utilities to provide transmission
9.

10.
11.

12.

See Todd S. Aagard, Energy-Environment Policy Alignments, 90 WASH. L.
REV. 1517, 1546 (2015) (“Broadening FERC’s authority to encompass externalities and other market failures . . . would fundamentally re-orient the
agency in ways that would likely generate significant opposition from both
inside and outside the agency—and perhaps from courts as well.”); John S.
Moot, Subsidies, Climate Change, Electric Markets and the FERC, 35
ENERGY L.J. 345, 348 (2014) (stating without explanation that ignoring generators’ GHG emissions is “fuel-neutral”); ERIC FILIPINK, NAT’L REGULATORY
RESEARCH INST., SERVING THE “PUBLIC INTEREST” — TRADITIONAL VS
EXPANSIVE UTILITY REGULATION NO. 10-02 (2009), https://perma.cc/UMU7WKXN (discussing aspects of issue in retail market context).
See generally New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002).
Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 38).
Id. at 4.
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services on a case-by-case basis.13 Crucially, however, it is the FPA
and not the 1992 Act that provides the legal basis for FERC’s creation of wholesale markets.14 Indeed, FERC went beyond what the
1992 Act required after recognizing that the process it prescribed
would be too costly and time-consuming to ensure just and reasonable rates.15
This paper proceeds as follows: Parts 2, 3, and 4 provide background on electricity infrastructure, wholesale markets, and carbon pricing respectively—topics that are likely familiar for some
readers. Part 5 briefly discusses New York State’s current carbon
pricing programs, which are designed to operate outside the wholesale electricity market. Part 6 explores mechanisms NYISO could
employ to implement a carbon price in the wholesale market. And
Part 7 offers arguments that could be presented in support of a
NYISO carbon price proposal to FERC.
II. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 101
Electricity services were historically provided by vertically integrated utilities, which owned generating units as well as transmission and distribution infrastructure.16 Each utility operated as
a regulated monopoly, selling electricity within an exclusive service territory.17 Regulation of electricity sales was—and still is—
shared between the federal government and the states.18 At the
federal level, FERC is authorized to regulate the transmission and
wholesale sale of electricity in interstate commerce under the
FPA.19 The FPA defines wholesale sales as sales of electricity “to
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See, e.g., Marcel A. Lamoureux, FERC’s Impact on Electric Utilities, 8 IEEE
POWER ENG’G REV. 8 (2001) (“As a direct result of the Energy Policy Act of
1992, FERC issued Orders 888 and 889 in 1996.”).
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 11 (2002) (“Rather than grounding its legal
authority [to issue Order 888] in Congress’ more recent electricity legislation, FERC cited §§ 205–206 of the 1935 FPA—the provisions concerning
FERC’s power to remedy unduly discriminatory practices—as providing the
authority for its rulemaking. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d–824e.”).
Id. at 11–14.
See generally New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002).
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012). See also Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,
376 U.S. 205 (1964).
16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b) (2012) (providing for federal regulation of the “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy
at wholesale in interstate commerce”).
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any person for resale.”20 Those sales are considered to occur in “interstate commerce” whenever electricity is transmitted via an interstate grid.21 Where transmission occurs via an intrastate grid,
the sale is not subject to regulation by FERC, but may be regulated
by the state in which it occurs.22 The states also regulate retail
electricity sales.23
In the contiguous U.S., electricity is transmitted via three
main synchronous grids, namely:
1. the Eastern Interconnection, which extends from central
Canada south to Florida and includes all U.S. territory
east of the Great Plains, except parts of Texas and Maine;
2. the Western Interconnection, which extends from western
Canada south to Mexico and includes all U.S. territory
west of the Great Plains; and
3. the Texas Interconnection, which covers most of Texas.24
As the Eastern and Western Interconnections cross state borders, electricity transmission thereon is considered to occur in interstate commerce, subjecting it to regulation by FERC.25 FERC’s
regulatory duties include ensuring that wholesale electricity rates
are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and that the bulk power system operates reliably.26

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. § 824(d).
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 461 (1972).
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). See also S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205.
S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205.
Learn More About Interconnections, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
https://perma.cc/S688-5L7T.
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2002).
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (requiring that “[a]ll rates and charges made, demanded,
or received by any public utility for . . . [the] sale of electric energy subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . shall be just and reasonable, and
any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to
be unlawful”); § 824d(b) (providing that “[n]o public utility shall, with respect to any . . . sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make
or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any
person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage”); § 824d(e) (authorizing
FERC to conduct “a hearing concerning the lawfulness of” any rate or
charge); § 824e(a) (requiring FERC, when it determines that a rate or
change “is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential . . .
[to] determine the just and reasonable rate” or charge); § 824o (providing
FERC with authority to enforce “reliability standards” via “Electric Reliability Organizations” certified by FERC).
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Figure 1: Transmission Interconnections in the
Continental U.S.27

For most of the 20th century, FERC regulated wholesale electricity rates exclusively on a cost-of-service basis, under which utilities were permitted to recover the prudent expenses they incurred
in providing services, plus a reasonable return on capital.28 Recently, however, FERC has increasingly relied on markets to set
rates. This shift began in the late 1980s, with FERC issuing a series of market-based rate authorizations which exempt utilities
and other suppliers from cost-of-service regulation, allowing them
to sell electricity at market-based rates.
A. The Evolution of Wholesale Electricity Markets
Historically, vertically-integrated utilities produced electricity
through self-supply (i.e., by constructing their own generating
units).29 Utilities also entered into long-term bilateral contracts to
27.
28.
29.

Matt Kasper, How to Secure the Grid and Save Ratepayers Money, ENERGY
& POLICY INSTITUTE, https://perma.cc/C3PP-FY77.
JAMES H. MCGREW, FERC: FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 179
(2d ed. 2009).
FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES
AND MATERIALS 659 (2000).
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purchase electricity from independently owned generating units.30
Such bilateral contracts are still widely used to procure electricity
today; procurement also occurs through wholesale spot markets in
some areas.31
The origins of wholesale markets can be traced back to the energy crisis of the 1970s. In response to the crisis, Congress enacted
the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”)32 to
incentivize alternative means of electricity generation, among
other things. PURPA led to the construction of hundreds of merchant generating facilities, the owners of which demanded access
to the utility-owned transmission grid to transport their electricity
to retailers and/or consumers.33 In response to those demands,
Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992,34 which authorized FERC to order individual utilities to provide transmission services to merchant generators.35 After issuing twelve such orders in
twelve separate proceedings, FERC determined that this case-bycase approach was too costly and time-consuming to provide an adequate remedy for undue discrimination.36 Thus, in 1996, it issued
Orders 88837 and 889 requiring all utilities to provide “open access”
transmission services.38
Orders 888 and 889 aimed to, among other things, enhance
merchant generators’ access to electric utilities’ transmission infrastructure.39 Utilities were required to unbundle electricity
transmission from sales40 and act as common carriers, providing

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 671.
Id. at 671, 787.
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)).
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 718–19.
Energy Policy Act of 1993, Pub. L. 102-486; 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
16 U.S.C. § 824j.
For a discussion of this issue, see New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 9–14 (2002).
Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385).
Order No. 889, Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly
Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,736 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37).
Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,540.
Id. at 21,525–29.
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transmission services to both affiliated and non-affiliated companies on a non-discriminatory basis.41 FERC suggested that utilities
could “ensure fair and non-discriminatory access to transmission
services” by forming independent system operators (“ISOs”) to
manage the transmission grid.42 Subsequently, in Order 2000,
FERC encouraged utilities to place their transmission facilities under the management of an ISO or Regional Transmission Operator
(“RTO”).43
ISO/RTOs are independent bodies which operate the transmission system in one or more states. Figure 2 below shows the
ISO/RTOs currently operating in the U.S. Six of those ISO/RTOs—
the California IOS (“CAISO”), Midcontinent ISO (“MISO”), New
England ISO (“ISO-NE”), NYISO, PJM Interconnection (“PJM”),
and Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”)—are regulated by FERC.44
FERC does not have regulatory authority over the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”), as its transmission system “is
located solely within the state of Texas and is not synchronously
interconnected to the rest of the United States.”45

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

Id.
Id. at 21,596.
Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,854
(July 20, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
CAISO, ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, PJM, and SPP operate interstate transmission facilities subject to FERC jurisdiction. 16 U.S.C. § 834(b)(1) (providing
that FERC has jurisdiction over all facilities used in the interstate transmission of electricity). See also Compliance, PJM, https://perma.cc/67VZD4R2; Diligent Oversight Ensures a Competitive Market, CAISO,
https://perma.cc/3L9K-ZGB6; History: 75 Years of Reliability Through Relationships, SPP, https://perma.cc/5YCZ-APEF; Industry Standards, Structure, and Relationships, ISO NEW ENGLAND, https://perma.cc/GX8N-WDK5;
Leadership and Governance, MISO, https://perma.cc/9EBT-WZKK; Regulatory Accountability, NYISO, https://perma.cc/AJY3-5HGP .
ERCOT, FERC, https://perma.cc/UE82-FFE3 (last updated Nov. 17, 2015).
ERCOT’s operations are overseen by the Public Utility Commission of Texas
and the state legislature. See Electric Power Markets: Texas (ERCOT),
FERC, https://perma.cc/GB6D-6SGV (last updated Mar. 10, 2016).
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Figure 2: ISO/RTOs Operating in the U.S.46

Each ISO/RTO is a non-profit or profit-neutral corporation
that contracts with transmission facility owners (“Transmission
Owners”) regarding transmission and wholesale market governance.47 In addition to those basic contracts, each ISO/RTO also
adopts two types of tariffs, subject to FERC review (ERCOT’s excepted), that specify how the ISO/RTO is to oversee regional transmission facilities and markets; the Open Access Transmission Tariff (“OATT”) governs to the former, the RTO tariff, sometimes
called the Market Services Tariff, the latter.48
46.
47.

48.

Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) / Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC, https://perma.cc/NBP4-837E (last updated Oct. 19, 2017).
CAISO, AMENDED AND RESTATED TRANSMISSION CONTROL AGREEMENT
AMONG THE CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR CORPORATION AND
TRANSMISSION OWNERS
(2017),
https://perma.cc/JRQ6-2EJ5;
PJM
INTERCONNECTION, AMENDED AND RESTATED OPERATING AGREEMENT OF PJM
INTERCONNECTION, LLC (2011), https://perma.cc/KX2K-2T8Y; Transmission
Operating Agreements, ISO NEW ENGLAND, https://perma.cc/UVB4-HWFL
(providing links to Transmission Operating Agreement, Rate Design and
Funds Disbursement Agreement, Phase I/II Transmission Operating Agreement, and Phase I/II HVDC transmission facility).
FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 53, 57
(2015), https://perma.cc/KT2H-QQ3Q.
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B. Wholesale Electricity Market Operation
Each ISO/RTO operates two wholesale electricity or “energy”
markets, namely:
1. a day-ahead market, in which participants commit to buy
or sell electricity at various times over the next twentyfour hours, based on forecast demand (“load”); and
2. a real-time market, in which participants buy and sell electricity to balance differences between the day ahead commitments and actual load and generation.49
Wholesale energy markets are open to any entity that, after
securing the necessary approvals, can generate electricity and deliver it to the grid. The principal suppliers in most markets are
utilities with excess generating capacity, utility-affiliated competitive generators, and independent power producers.50 The principal buyers in most markets are LSEs, which provide retail electricity services to residential, commercial, and industrial customers.
LSEs participating in wholesale energy markets currently serve
consumers accounting for two-thirds of national electricity load.51
While the specific design of energy markets varies between
ISO/RTOs, all use bid-based auctions to set prices. During the auction, generators submit bids indicating the price at which they are
willing to supply electricity, based on their marginal costs.52 Generators are dispatched based on their bids, from lowest to highest,
until load is satisfied.53 The bid of the last supplier dispatched (the
49.
50.

51.
52.

53.

FERC, SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH: DEFINITION, PRACTICES,
ISSUES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5–6 (2006), https://perma.cc/8HW6-KKHC.
Another category of suppliers is demand-response aggregators—entities
that enlist end-users to participate in demand-response programs, whereby
the end-users agree to curtail their electricity use at certain times and sell
the combined load reduction in wholesale energy markets.
Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FERC, https://perma.cc/2X7RS2RH (last updated Feb. 9, 2016).
Generators’ bids typically reflect their variable costs of operation, including
operations and maintenance costs, fuel costs, and emissions costs (e.g., the
cost of acquiring emissions permits) (if any). SUSAN F. TIERNEY & PAUL J.
HIBBARD, ANALYSIS GRP., CARBON CONTROL AND COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE
ELECTRICITY MARKETS: COMPLIANCE PATHS FOR EFFICIENT MARKET
OUTCOMES 35 (2015), https://perma.cc/F2Q7-WUFK.
An ISO/RTO may elect not to dispatch generators on the basis of cost if doing
so would threaten the security of the electricity system. Thus, for example,
an ISO/RTO may choose not to dispatch the least-cost generator if doing so
would result in transmission congestion or other operational problems. This
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“marginal generator”) determines the market-clearing price which
is paid to all suppliers regardless of their bids (see Example 1).54

Several ISO/RTOs also administer auctions for procuring capacity. In Order 2000, FERC determined that ISO/RTOs should be
responsible for maintaining electric system reliability,55 which, in
practice, means ensuring sufficient generating capacity is available to satisfy load.56 To that end, ISO/RTOs may operate capacity
markets in which owners of generating facilities are paid to have

54.
55.
56.

approach is known as “security constrained least-cost” dispatch. For a discussion of security constrained least cost dispatch, see FERC, supra note 49,
at 5–9.
AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND REGIONAL
TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/V74X-WH99.
Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,854,
45,854 (July 20, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP. (NERC), 2016 LONG-TERM RELIABILITY
ASSESSMENT 1 (2016) (explaining that, over the long term, reliability is primarily a function of resource adequacy).
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reserves57 available in case they are needed in the future.58 Capacity markets operate in a similar way to energy markets, with participants submitting bids that reflect the price at which they are
willing to buy and sell capacity.59 The ISO/RTO then matches the
bids to determine a clearing price, which is typically expressed per
unit of capacity and paid to suppliers monthly.60 Whereas capacity
prices are recovered through fixed monthly payments, electricity
prices fluctuate hourly.
If there were no logistical impediments to the flow of electricity, a single price would apply throughout an ISO/RTO region for
a given interval.61 However, because transmission congestion
and/or other operational problems regularly impede electricity
flows, some areas must rely on electricity priced above the region’s
lowest price.62 To account for differences in the cost of electricity
used in different areas, ISO/RTOs price electricity using the locational marginal price (“LMP”) at each of various nodes (i.e., locations) on the transmission system.63

57.

58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

The term “reserves” refers to generating capacity that is currently unused
but which is available to serve load. See generally ZHI ZHOU ET AL., CTR. FOR
ENERGY, ENVTL., AND ECON. SYS. ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF U.S. ANCILLARY
SERVICES MARKETS (2016), https://perma.cc/HQ8N-4NBM (“[R]eserves are
typically segmented into two categories, 1) Spinning or Synchronized Reserves that are provided by generation units that are actively generating
and have the ability to increase or decrease their output, 2) Non-spinning or
Non-synchronized Reserves that are provided by generation resources that
are not actively generating, but are able to start up and provide generation
within a specified timeframe. Operating reserves typically have response
times on the order of ten to 30 minutes and can similarly be provided by
supply-side resources that are capable of reducing their load.”).
Alternatively, an ISO/RTO may impose “resource adequacy” obligations on
load-serving entities, requiring them to self-supply capacity, either through
construction of new capacity resources or by entering into bilateral arrangements to purchase capacity. See TIERNEY & HIBBARD, supra note 52, at 36.
Adam James, Explainer: How Capacity Markets Work, MIDWEST ENERGY
NEWS (Jun. 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/8VTY-U9X4.
Id. See also What You Need to Know About Capacity Payments,
ENERGYWATCH, https://perma.cc/KJ8B-V6P5.
PJM INTERCONNECTION, LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING (2016),
https://perma.cc/T9VQ-KD4K.
Id.
For a discussion of locational marginal pricing, see Frequently Asked Questions, Locational Marginal Pricing, ISO-NE, https://perma.cc/2FCU-ULAT;
NYISO, “Locational Based Marginal Pricing: The Cornerstone of the NYISO
Market Operation,” https://perma.cc/FXR3-VJWL; and Buying & Selling
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III. ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN NEW YORK
Electricity transmission and wholesale electricity sales in New
York are managed by NYISO. NYISO’s responsibilities include balancing electricity generation and load in the New York Control
Area (“NYCA”), which is coterminous with New York’s borders.64
NYISO divides the NYCA into 11 Zones (see Figure 3 below). Of
those, the five “downstate” Zones (Long Island, New York City,
Dunwoodie, Millwood, and the Lower Hudson Valley) account for
about fifty-eight percent of the state’s load and sixty-five percent
of its peak load, but generate only forty percent of its electricity.65
This mismatch has made congestion between downstate and upstate zones66—and downstate transmission adequacy more generally—a high-priority issue.67 The addition of over 2,700 MW of
transmission capacity since 2000 has not resolved the issue, not
least because peak load continues to grow even as NYISO-wide
load has flattened out.68

64.
65.
66.
67.

68.

Energy,
Locational
Marginal
Pricing,
PJM INTERCONNECTION,
https://perma.cc/6BED-UX4C.
NYISO, “Power System Fundamentals,” Slide 11 (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/T2JR-RQHJ.
NYISO, POWER TRENDS 2016: THE CHANGING ENERGY LANDSCAPE 2, 29
(2016), https://perma.cc/W3QB-9DZH [hereinafter NYISO, POWER TRENDS
2016].
B. Howard et al., Current and Near-Term GHG Emissions Factors from Electricity Production for New York State and New York City, 187 APPLIED
ENERGY 255, 258 (2017).
See DAVID B. PATTON ET AL., POTOMAC ECONOMICS, 2015 STATE OF THE
MARKET REPORT FOR THE NEW YORK ISO MARKETS 10 (2016),
https://perma.cc/DRW2-GSFJ (charting levels of inter-zone congestion and
noting that the value of congestion—meaning costs resulting from it—were
$539 and $700 for the day-ahead and real-time energy markets respectively).
NYISO, POWER TRENDS 2016, supra note 65, at 9–10 fig.6.
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Figure 3: NYISO Zones A through K69

The generation mix in NYISO has changed substantially over
the last decade.70 Since 2000, coal and oil have declined, natural
gas and renewables have made up the difference, and nuclear and
hydro have held steady (see Figure 4).71 These changes have contributed to substantial reductions in regional emissions: annual
sulfur dioxide emissions have dropped ninety-seven percent and
carbon dioxide emissions forty-two percent.72

69.
70.
71.
72.

Electric Power Markets: New York (NYISO), FERC, https://perma.cc/WQ7XDVR8 (last updated Aug. 3, 2017).
See NYISO, 2016 LOAD & CAPACITY DATA, GOLD BOOK (2016),
https://perma.cc/W45L-JLDR.
NYISO, POWER TRENDS 2016, supra note 65, at 26 fig.20.
Id. at 36.
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Figure 4: NYISO Generation Mix 2000 - 201673

A. NYISO Markets for Energy, Capacity, and
Ancillary Services
Like other ISO/RTOs, NYISO manages markets that allocate
energy, ancillary services, and capacity. The energy and ancillary
services markets establish prices reflective of the value of energy
at each locational node on the NYISO transmission network.74 The
capacity markets establish prices reflective of expectations for how
much existing and new capacity will be required to meet demand
generally and at peak times.75
NYISO’s markets for energy assign location-specific prices in
five-minute increments based on day-ahead and real-time auctions, as well as bilateral contracts between wholesalers and retailers.76 The day-ahead market schedules about ninety-six percent of

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 26.
NYISO, NYISO MARKETS: NEW YORK’S MARKETPLACE FOR WHOLESALE
ELECTRICITY 4, https://perma.cc/48C2-Q7JP [hereinafter NYISO, NYISO
MARKETS].
Id.
Id. at 11.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1

20

2017]

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets

21

the energy that is delivered in NYISO; the real-time market schedules the remainder and thereby serves as a corrective for dayahead arrangements that over- or under-estimate load.77 Auctions
account for about sixty percent of NYISO’s energy transactions; bilateral contracts account for the remaining forty percent.78
NYISO’s ancillary services markets assign prices to a group of
operations that underpin reliability by filling in gaps left by the
energy markets. NYISO provides some of those operations, some
are provided by transmission customers and suppliers, and others
are self-provided by NYISO market participants.79 These operations, which draw on both physical equipment and human resources, include:
• voltage support, meaning maintenance of a voltage level
that falls within both power quality requirements and
transmission facilities’ heat tolerances;80
• regulation and frequency response, which involves minuteto-minute adjustments that balance out unexpected small
changes in generation and load;81
• energy imbalance, which is the term of art for allocations
and settlements arrived at through the real-time market
that correct for over- or under-estimates by day-ahead
market participants and managers;82
• operating reserves, which stand ready to provide backup
electricity or demand response for ten- and thirty-minute
intervals in case of a sudden large change in generation or
load at a given nodal location;83 and
• black start capability, which is the ability of a generating
unit to, after shutting down due to a general blackout and
without assistance from the grid, begin operating and delivering power to the grid.84
Whereas NYISO’s energy and ancillary services markets provide for electricity services in the short term, its installed capacity
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

PATTON ET AL., supra note 67, at 36.
NYISO, NYISO MARKETS, supra note 74, at 4.
NYISO, ANCILLARY SERVICES MANUAL 1-1 (2016), https://perma.cc/ENW4ED26.
Id. at 3-1.
Id. at 4-1.
Id. at 5-1.
Id. at 6-1 to 6-2.
Id. at 7-1.
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market (“ICAP”) trades in options to access transmission, generation, and demand response resources at some date up to six months
in the future.85 NYISO’s ICAP operates through a series of auctions.86 In the Capability Period Auction or “strip auction,” which
occurs twice each year,87 buyers and sellers trade for one or more
months of capacity. Subsequent Monthly Auctions, held at least 15
days before the next calendar month (called an “Obligation Procurement Period”), allocate capacity for any gaps left by the Capability Period Auction.88 Finally, Spot Market Auctions, held at
least two days before each Obligation Procurement Period, resolve
any remaining gaps.89 By assigning auction-derived prices to options to access particular resources, the ICAP signals when additional resources—whether located within the NYCA or other balancing areas—are foreseeably necessary to ensure reliability over
the subsequent months.90
B. NYISO’s Approach to Planning and Tariff Revision
Although NYISO’s geographic boundaries align with those of
New York, NYISO’s physical integration in the Eastern Intercon-

85.

86.

87.
88.
89.
90.

NYISO, NYISO MARKETS, supra note 74, at 11; see also EMILIE NELSON,
NYISO, WRITTEN STATEMENT, DOCKET NO. AD14-18-000, JOINT TECHNICAL
CONFERENCE ON NEW YORK MARKETS & INFRASTRUCTURE 2–5 (2014),
https://perma.cc/SH7V-5BEV (summarizing recent history of ICAP).
NYISO, INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL §§ 5-1 to 5-5 (2016),
https://perma.cc/L9LH-HAGE [hereinafter NYISO, INSTALLED CAPACITY
MANUAL]. The parameters for “reliability,” which include reserve margins
and other elements, are specified by the New York State Reliability Council.
See generally N.Y. STATE RELIABILITY COUNCIL, RELIABILITY RULES &
COMPLIANCE MANUAL FOR PLANNING AND OPERATING THE NEW YORK STATE
POWER SYSTEM, VERSION 38 (2016), https://perma.cc/8YVT-5MSG.
Auctions must be held at least thirty days before each capability period. The
summer capability period runs from May through October, while the winter
period runs from November through April.
NYISO, INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL, supra note 86, at 5-3 (2016).
Id. at 5-4.
NYISO, INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL, supra note 86, at 2-1 to 2-2. The parameters for “reliability,” which include reserve margins and other elements, are specified by the New York State Reliability Council. See generally
N.Y. STATE RELIABILITY COUNCIL, supra note 86.
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nection means that it trades energy and services in interstate commerce, subjecting it to FERC’s authority pursuant to the FPA.91 As
noted in Part II above, under the FPA, FERC is authorized to regulate interstate electricity transmission and wholesale sales.92
FERC’s regulatory authority extends to “any person who owns or
operates facilities” used in those activities (defined as a “public
utility”).93 As the operator of New York’s transmission facilities,
NYISO is a public utility for the purposes of the FPA.
NYISO codifies nearly all its decision-making protocols in the
OATT and MST it files with FERC. These tariffs provide comprehensive prescriptions for parameters to be achieved, parties to involve, procedures to follow, and valid bases for issuing directions
and allocating resources.94 This subsection summarizes key features of planning and tariff amendment in NYISO, both of which
give prominent roles to stakeholders.95
1. Planning
NYISO’s Comprehensive System Planning Process updates an
operational model of facilities in NYISO and yields plans for maintaining reliability over the coming ten-year period.96 It consists of
the following four subsidiary processes:
1. Local Transmission Planning Process (“LTPP”);
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.

96.

16 U.S.C. § 824(b). Disputes still sometimes arise over previously unexplored instances of jurisdictional line-drawing between NYISO and state entities like the New York PSC. See, e.g., Competitive Transmission Developers v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 156 FERC ¶ 61,164, 61,718 (Sept. 8,
2016) (“CTD contends that NYISO improperly surrenders its responsibilities to the New York Commission.”); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 153
FERC ¶ 61,010, 61,040 (Oct. 2, 2015) (resolving that NYISO rather than the
PSC had jurisdiction to “establish[] compensation for a generator’s return to
service to resolve a reliability need”).
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)–(2).
Id. § 824(e).
The November 2016 combined version of these tariffs weighed in at almost
2,800 pages. See NYISO, NYISO TARIFFS (2016), https://perma.cc/4W5KWQK2.
References to “stakeholders” in NYISO tariffs and manuals indicate merchant transmission developers, generation plant owners, generation developers, demand response providers, and other participants. NYISO,
RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL 2-2 (2016), https://perma.cc/8PE7LWLG [hereinafter NYISO, RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL].
See NYISO, OATT, ATTACHMENT Y § 3(a) (2008), https://perma.cc/8FPL5YT2 (codifying approach to Comprehensive System Planning Process).
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2. Reliability Planning Process (“RPP”);
3. Congestion Assessment and Resource Integration Study
(“CARIS”); and
4. Public Policy Transmission Planning Process (“PPTPP”).97
NYISO coordinates the timing of these subsidiary processes so
that the LTPP is followed by the RPP, which is followed by the
CARIS; the PPTPP begins midway through LTPP.
The LTPP gathers NYISO Transmission Owners’ studies of
their respective areas (“Local Transmission Plans,” or “LTPs”) for
review by stakeholders and NYISO’s Electric System Planning
Working Group and Transmission Planning Advisory Subcommittee.98 LTPs can be thought of as schematic maps of existing and
planned transmission facilities, complete with descriptions of those
facilities’ operational features.99
The biennial RPP builds on the LTPs drafted by each of
NYISO’s eight Transmission Owners.100 The RPP consists of the
development, review by stakeholders, and approval by NYISO’s
Board of Directors of two studies. The first, known as the Reliability Needs Assessment (“RNA”), memorializes NYISO staff’s assessment of whether existing and planned Bulk Power Transmission
Facilities are expected to meet Reliability Criteria for resource adequacy, security, and stability over a ten-year time horizon.101 The
RNA identifies Reliability Needs—i.e., deficiencies vis-à-vis Reliability Criteria that signal where transmission and other projects
might be necessary—and specifies a Responsible Transmission
Owner for each need.102 Once NYISO’s Board of Directors approves

97.
98.

NYISO, RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL, supra note 95, at 1-1.
See NYISO, MARKETS & OPERATIONS: LOCAL TRANSMISSION OWNER PLANNING
PROCESS, https://perma.cc/5T6Z-9GUA (“Customers, Market Participants
and other interested parties may review and comment on the planning criteria and assumptions used by each Transmission Owner, as well as other
data and models used by each Transmission Owner in its LTPP.”).
99. See, e.g., Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), “Local Transmission Owner
Plan (LTP), Presentation to NYISO Interested Parties” (Oct. 24, 2013),
https://perma.cc/824X-S67U.
100. NYISO,
2016
RELIABILITY
NEEDS
ASSESSMENT
(2016),
https://perma.cc/7JGP-6VUS.
101. See id. at 26–41.
102. NYISO, RELIABILITY PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL, supra note 97, at 1-4.
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the RNA, NYISO requests proposals to address each identified Reliability Need103 and, at the same time, seeks a “regulated backstop
solution” from the Responsible Transmission Owner.104 For the
purpose of the RPP, a backstop solution serves both as a benchmark against which to assess market-based solutions’ viability
and—of course—as a backstop in case no satisfactory marketbased solution materializes.
The second report prepared as part of the RPP, known as the
Comprehensive Reliability Plan (“CRP”), lists all viable solutions
proposed to address Reliability Needs and contains NYISO’s evaluation of those solutions.105 NYISO selects from among viable solutions based on their relative cost-effectiveness.
Completion of the CRP prompts the start of the third subsidiary planning process: CARIS. Like the RPP, CARIS identifies possible needs, seeks proposed solutions, and then evaluates and selects from among those solutions.106 The chief difference is that
congestion, unlike Reliability Needs, is chiefly an issue of cost-effectiveness rather than system stability, security, or reliability.
Thus, both the identification and evaluation phases of CARIS involve cost-benefit analyses that can result in a decision to simply
tolerate—rather than address—a given instance of congestion.107
The PPTPP addresses “public policy requirements,” which
NYISO defines as a:
federal or New York State statute or regulation, including a New
York Public Service Commission (“NYPSC”) order adopting a rule
or regulation . . . , or any duly enacted law or regulation passed by
a local governmental entity in New York State, that may relate to

103. Id. Proposals can include all resource types: transmission, generation, demand response, or non-transmission alternatives.
104. Id. Whereas market-based solutions receive compensation through NYISOadministered markets or bilateral agreements, backstop solutions receive
compensation directly from NYISO pursuant to provisions of NYISO’s tariff.
105. Id. at 1-5.
106. NYISO, ECONOMIC PLANNING PROCESS MANUAL – CONGESTION ASSESSMENT
AND
RESOURCE
INTEGRATION
STUDIES
1-4
to
1-5
(2014),
https://perma.cc/Z3QC-2C6L.
107. This is why NYISO categorizes the CARIS as part of its economic planning
process rather than the RPP or public-policy-oriented process. See NYISO,
PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION PLANNING MANUAL 1-2 to 1-3 (2015),
https://perma.cc/ACT6-VVP3 [hereinafter NYISO,
PUBLIC POLICY
TRANSMISSION PLANNING MANUAL].
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transmission planning on the [Bulk Power Transmission Facilities].108

The PPTPP was developed to identify transmission needs
rooted in public policy in compliance with FERC’s Order 1000, and
it looks to the NYPSC to help identify and specify public policy requirements.109 The subjects of public policy requirements in New
York include reducing congestion (on its own or as a means of reducing electricity rates) and reducing the carbon intensity of generation in the NYCA, among others.110
NYISO initiates the PPTPP upon the release of a draft version
of the RNA, at which point the PPTPP follows the same basic steps
as the RPP and CARIS: identify needs, seek viable solutions, evaluate solutions (in the PPTPP context, make a Viability and Sufficiency Assessment), and select from among solutions based on efficiency and cost-effectiveness.111 A recent example of the PPTPP
at work relates to plans to “unbottle” the transmission linkage connecting western New York to the hydroelectric generation and
pumped storage facilities located near Niagara Falls.112 The
NYPSC designated unbottling as a Public Policy Transmission
Need after concluding that it would result in “significant environmental, economic, and reliability benefits.”113 Whatever project or
projects address a transmission need will qualify as a Public Policy
Transmission Project, eligible to recover costs under NYISO’s

108. NYISO, OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION TARIFF, ATTACHMENT Y § 31.1.1 (2016),
https://perma.cc/3QHZ-FNU6.
109. Order Addressing Public Policy Transmission Need for Western New York,
Case No. 14-E-0454 at 2–3 (N.Y. Pub .Serv. Comm’n Oct. 13, 2016),
https://perma.cc/3WK5-NP97 [hereinafter Case No. 14-E-0454] (describing
origin and purpose of PPTPP).
110. Order Finding Transmission Needs Driven by Public Policy Requirements,
Case No. 12-T-0502 et al. at 8–12 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 17, 2015),
https://perma.cc/5RZU-4565 [hereinafter Case No. 12-T-0502].
111. NYISO, PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION PLANNING MANUAL, supra note 107, at
1-3.
112. Case No. 14-E-0454, supra note 109, at 5–7 (describing need); NYISO,
WESTERN NEW YORK PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION NEED PROJECT
SOLICITATION (2016), https://perma.cc/ULS5-HCTJ (requesting Solicitations
to address need).
113. Oct. 13, 2016 Order, Case 14-E-0454, supra note 109, at 4–5.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1

26

2017]

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets

27

OATT.114 In its comments in an ongoing NYPSC proceeding dealing with transmission needs, NYISO observed that “[a]ll of the
Submittals point to the [New York Clean Energy Standard], which
requires 50 percent of the state’s electric energy to come from renewable resources by 2030 (‘50% by 30’), as a primary driver of the
need for new transmission facilities in New York.”115 Thus, it appears that many, if not all, transmission proposals currently before
NYISO could qualify as a Public Policy Transmission Project.
2. Tariff Revisions and Stakeholder Involvement
NYISO uses a multi-committee review process to make decisions, including about whether to propose a tariff revision for
FERC’s approval. NYISO’s basic contract provides for three committees: Management, Operations, and Business Issues.116 Each is
further governed by By-Laws.117 Formally, NYISO may propose revisions to its MST or OATT to FERC if majorities of the ten-member NYISO Board of Directors and the Management Committee
concur.118 But this formal step is just the last in a more elaborate
process, sometimes called the “shared governance process” or
“stakeholder review process.”119 Figure 5 depicts the structure of
committees and subsidiary subcommittees and working groups
whose members review, mark up, and revise proposals before the
Management, Operations, or Business Issues Committee finalizes

114. NYISO, PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION PLANNING MANUAL, supra note 107, at
3-3.
115. In the Matter of New York Independent System Operator, Inc.’s Proposed
Public Policy Transmission Needs for Consideration for 2016, Case No. 16E-0558 at 7 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/GA4FXZEF.
116. NYISO, NYISO AGREEMENTS art. 7–9 (2013), https://perma.cc/4NN2-6MAM.
117. NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE BUSINESS ISSUES COMMITTEE (2015),
https://perma.cc/CP59-5Y9Z; NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE (2015), https://perma.cc/5CNB-NXWS [hereinafter NYISO, BYLAWS OF THE BUSINESS ISSUES COMMITTEE]; NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE
OPERATING COMMITTEE (2015), https://perma.cc/59CZ-H9J6 [hereinafter
NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE OPERATING COMMITTEE].
118. NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE NYISO, INC. art. II § 6(b) (2016),
https://perma.cc/WFR8-U7WL; NYISO, NYISO AGREEMENTS art. 19 (2013),
https://perma.cc/4NN2-6MAM [hereinafter NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE NYISO,
INC.].
119. See
generally
NYISO,
NYISO SHARED
GOVERNANCE
(2017),
https://perma.cc/Z4LM-3ZVH.
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them for consideration by the Board.120
Figure 5: NYISO Committee Structure

Percolation up through this committee structure ensures that
committee members receive notice and an opportunity to be heard
on matters relevant to their client or constituents. NYISO’s basic
contract allocates votes on the Management Committee among
generators, other suppliers, transmission owners, end-use consumers, and public power and environmental groups;121 the other committees follow the same rubric.122

120. For a short description of what each component contributes to the whole, see
NYISO, COMMITTEE STRUCTURE: SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES 2–5 (2014),
https://perma.cc/WE8Q-DUZY.
121. NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE NYISO, INC., supra note 118, at art. 7, § 7.06.
122. NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE BUSINESS ISSUES COMMITTEE, supra note 117, at
§ 12.01; NYISO, BY-LAWS OF THE OPERATING COMMITTEE, supra note 117, at
§ 12.01.
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C. FERC Oversight of NYISO
The FPA requires public utilities to notify FERC before making changes to rates or “rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to” rates.123 Such notice must be given by filing, with FERC,
new rate schedules showing the change(s) to be made to the schedules in force.124 The new schedules will take effect after sixty days
unless FERC, on its own initiative or following a complaint, commences a review thereof.125 Where a review is undertaken, FERC
may suspend operation of the schedules for up to five months while
it assesses their lawfulness.126 Based on that assessment, FERC
may accept or reject the schedule, in whole or in part.127
FERC’s review is intended to ensure that the rates and practices set out in the schedule are just and reasonable128 and not unduly preferential or discriminatory.129 These terms are not defined
in the FPA or other legislation. Guidance on their meaning has,
however, been provided in numerous administrative and court decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that the just
and reasonable standard is “incapable of precise judicial definition.”130 FERC is, therefore, “afford[ed] great deference . . . in its

123. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a), (d) (stating that “no change shall be made by any public
utility in any . . . rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after sixty days’ notice to the Commission”).
124. Id. § 824d(a). FERC may allow changes to take effect without requiring sixty
days’ notice.
125. Id. § 824d(e).
126. Id. The schedules will go into effect after five months, regardless of whether
FERC has completed its review.
127. Id. (indicating that, after completing its assessment, FERC “may make such
orders with reference [to the rates] as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective”). See also id. § 824e (authorizing FERC
to determine just and reasonable rates).
128. Id. § 824d(a) (requiring that “all rates . . . made, demanded, or received by
any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electricity energy . . . and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to
such rates . . . be just and reasonable”).
129. Id. § 824d(b) (providing that public utilities must not “(1) make or grant any
undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any
undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect”).
130. Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
532 (2008).
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rate decisions.”131 FERC is not required to set rates at any particular level132 or use any particular methodology.133 The only requirement is that the methodology used appropriately balance the
interests of suppliers and customers,134 such that rates fall “within
a ‘zone of reasonableness,’ where [they] are neither ‘less than compensatory’ nor ‘excessive.’”135 Rates must be high enough to enable
suppliers to recover their costs and earn a return on investment,136
but not so high as to result in customer exploitation, abuse, or
gouging or unjust discrimination between customer groups.137
The same just and reasonable standard applies to both costand market-based rates. With respect to the latter, FERC has
taken the view that rates set in competitive markets will fall
within the “zone of reasonableness,” provided that no participant
can exercise market power.138 This approach has been upheld by
the courts. In Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit observed that, “[i]n a competitive market, where neither buyer nor
seller has significant market power, it is rational to assume that
the terms of their voluntary exchange are reasonable.”139 In this
context, market power has been defined as the ability of a seller to
“significantly influence price in the market by withholding service
and excluding competitors for a significant period of time.”140 Prior
to approving a market-based tariff, FERC requires the seller to
demonstrate that it lacks or has adequately mitigated market
power and is unable to erect barriers to entry.141 FERC monitors
sellers’ activities in the market to ensure that they do not re-attain

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968).
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
Id.
Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1502 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603.
Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 734 F.2d at 1502.
Order No. 697, Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy,
Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,903,
39,906 (July 20, 2017) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
This definition was adopted in FERC’s first market-based rate authorization. See Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 FERC ¶ 61,210, 61,777 (Aug. 8,
1989).
Order No. 697, 72 Fed. Reg. at 39,908.
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market power.142
FERC has also taken steps to enhance the functioning of markets and improve their competitiveness. For example, beginning in
2008, FERC adopted several orders aimed at removing barriers to
the participation of demand-side resources in markets.143 More recently, in 2014, FERC initiated a broad-ranging review of market
design and operational practices that may impair competition.144
Based on that review’s findings, FERC has required various design
changes aimed at improving how markets run.145 Thus, as the Supreme Court has observed, FERC “ensure[s] ‘just and reasonable’
wholesale [electricity] rates by enhancing competition—attempting . . . to break down regulatory and economic barriers that hinder
a free market in wholesale.”146
IV. PRICING CARBON IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
There is growing interest among ISO/RTOs in incorporating
carbon pricing into wholesale energy and/or capacity markets. In
August 2016, NYISO launched the Integrating Public Policy Project (“IPPP”) to assess whether introduction of a carbon price
“would improve the overall efficiency of . . . energy and capacity
markets,” among other things.147 Proposals for how to better respond to state and federal policies aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation have also been considered
by CAISO, ISO-NE, and PJM.
142. Id.
143. Order No. 745, Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale
Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,657 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 745]; Order No. 719, Wholesale Competition
in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,775 (July 29,
2009) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
144. FERC, Notice: Price Formation in Energy and Ancillary Services Markets
Docket Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent
System Operators, Docket No. AD14-14-000 (June 19, 2014),
https://perma.cc/W2ZL-BZEB.
145. See, e.g., Order No. 825, Settlement Intervals and Shortage Pricing in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent
System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,881 (June 30, 2016) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 825].
146. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (quoting Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v.
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 536 (2008)).
147. Mike DeSocio, “NYISO, 2017 Integrating Public Policy: Detailed Scope,”
Slide 3 (2016), https://perma.cc/MQ3P-LYTD.
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A. Electricity Generation and Carbon Dioxide
Emissions
Electricity generation is a leading source of carbon dioxide
emissions in the U.S. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), electricity generation emitted over two billion
metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2014, equivalent to 36.7 percent of
national carbon dioxide emissions.148 The level of emissions from a
particular generating unit varies depending on the fuel used and
its carbon intensity.149 Coal is the most carbon-intensive generating fuel, followed by oil (which contains twenty-five percent less
carbon than coal per unit of energy) and gas (which contains fortyfive percent less carbon than coal).150 Other generating fuels, such
as nuclear and renewables, contain little or no carbon.
When coal and other fossil fuels are combusted during electricity generation, the carbon stored in the fuel is oxidized, producing
carbon dioxide and small amounts of other gases.151 The Energy
Information Administration (“EIA”) estimates that coal-fired generating units emit, on average, 2.1 pounds of carbon dioxide per
kilowatt hour (“KWh”) of electricity generated.152 Carbon dioxide
emissions from oil- and gas-fired units average 1.7153 and 1.2154
pounds per KWh of electricity generated respectively.
Carbon dioxide traps heat in the earth’s atmosphere, causing
surface temperatures to rise. According to the 2014 National Climate Assessment, average annual temperatures in the U.S. have
risen by 1 to 2oF since 1895, and may rise a further 2 to 4oF “over

148. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990 – 2014
ES-5, tbl.ES-2 (2016), https://perma.cc/T3LT-5AMU.
149. Id. at 3-6, tbl.3-6.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 3-8.
152. Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced per Kilowatt Hour when Generating Electricity with Fossil Fuels?, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (“EIA”) (Feb. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/VHF4-8EDV (estimating
emissions from generating units using bituminous coal, subbituminous coal,
and lignite coal at 2.07, 2.16, and 2.17 pounds per kilowatt hour (“KWh”)
respectively).
153. Id. (estimating emissions from generating units using distillate oil (no. 2)
and residual oil (no. 6) at 1.64 and 1.76 pounds per KWh respectively).
154. Id. (estimating emissions from generating units using natural gas at 1.22
pounds per KWh).
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the next few decades.”155 Temperatures have risen far faster in
Alaska—since 1949, average annual temperatures have risen by
3.73oF and average winter temperatures by 6.71oF.156 Rising temperatures lead to more variable precipitation patterns and increase
the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Impacts expected in the New York region include more frequent and intense
heat waves, more intense precipitation events, storm surges incident to sea level rise, and more powerful coastal storms.157 These
impacts are already being felt in many areas and “have affected
and will continue to affect human health, water supply, agriculture, transportation, energy . . . and many other sectors of society”
over coming decades.158
B. Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from
Electricity Generation
Recognizing that climate change endangers public health and
welfare, in December 2009, the EPA listed carbon dioxide as an air
pollutant under the Clean Air Act.159 EPA regulations, adopted in
August 2015 and known as the Clean Power Plan, aim to reduce
emissions from existing electric generating units by thirty-two percent below 2005 levels by 2025.160 The regulations establish emissions limits for each state’s electricity sector but do not specify how
those limits are to be achieved.161 This is left to the discretion of

155. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 8 (Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014),
https://perma.cc/6S2L-66DV.
156. Temperature Changes in Alaska, UNIV. OF ALASKA-FAIRBANKS: ALASKA
CLIMATE RESEARCH CTR., https://perma.cc/M6T7-XND2.
157. New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report Executive Summary,
1336 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 9, 9–11 (2015), https://perma.cc/3LCU-58YM.
158. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 155, at 9.
159. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15,
2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1).
160. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed implementation of the regulations, pending judicial review. See West Virginia v.
EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
161. See
Clean
Power
Plan
State-Specific
Fact
Sheets,
EPA,
https://perma.cc/8872-AXVM (last updated Sept. 16, 2016).
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the states, which have wide latitude in deciding how to comply. A
number of states were considering carbon pricing as a means of
complying with the Clean Power Plan.162 Notably, however, many
states suspended their compliance work following the February
2016 Supreme Court decision to stay implementation of the Clean
Power Plan pending resolution of legal challenges thereto.163 Even if
the Clean Power Plan is upheld by the courts, and not successfully repealed by the
Trump Administration’s EPA,164 it is unlikely to be implemented for the duration of the Trump Administration, having been strongly opposed
by President Trump during his campaign.165
C. Why Put a Price on Carbon Dioxide Emissions?
The costs associated with carbon dioxide emissions are generally not reflected in electricity market prices.166 Those costs take
the form of “externalities”—impacts felt by third parties or the
public at large—but have no price attributed to them by market
participants.167 This results in a market failure, whereby prices
are lower than costs, leading to higher levels of production and consumption than are socially optimal.168 Government intervention is
therefore needed to ensure that social costs are fully considered in
production and consumption decisions.169 Such intervention could
162. See, e.g., MELINDA E. TAYLOR & ROMANY M. WEBB, UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW,
EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN: IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS 15 (2015),
https://perma.cc/99DR-CM5L.
163. E&E’s Power Plan Hub: Supreme Court Stay Response, E&E NEWS (2016),
https://perma.cc/3RW5-VDGX.
164. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed
Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
165. Annie Sneed, Trump’s First 100 Days: Climate and Energy, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Nov. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/RKF8-D7U7.
166. For a discussion of this issue, see NOAH KAUFMAN ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES
INST., PUTTING A PRICE ON CARBON: REDUCING EMISSIONS 6 (2016),
https://perma.cc/4NFQ-K3AD.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED
CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE 3 (2010),
https://perma.cc/2AHP-VD5W (stating that, when prices do not reflect external costs, they “are ‘hidden’ in the sense that government and other decision makers, such as electric utility managers, may not recognize the full
costs of their actions. When market failures like this occur, there may be a
case for government interventions in the form of regulations, taxes, fees,
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take a number of forms, including command-and-control regulations that limit the use of fossil fuels in electricity generation, or
market-based instruments, such as carbon pricing.
A carbon price internalizes the external costs of carbon dioxide
emissions from electricity generation and thus increases the cost
of generation using fossil fuels, leading to lower demand from consumers and encouraging generators to switch to cleaner alternatives. Generators will make the switch and/or take other steps to
reduce emissions wherever the costs of doing so are less than the
carbon price. In this way, carbon pricing affords generators flexibility to find and exploit the most cost-effective emissions reductions. It tends to be more efficient than command-and-control regulation, which may force generators to pursue higher-cost
emissions reductions.
Despite these benefits, to date, Congress has failed to enact
legislation establishing a national carbon pricing scheme. In the
absence of federal action, some states have adopted their own,
more limited pricing schemes. One example is California, which
has established a cap-and-trade program requiring in-state electricity generators and importers170 emitting 25,000 metric tons or
more of carbon dioxide equivalent per year to purchase allowances,
at prices set through quarterly auctions.171 Another even more limited example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),
in which New York and eight other northeastern states participate.172 As part of RGGI, fossil fuel generators with at least
twenty-five megawatts (“MW”) of capacity in New York and other
participating states are required to purchase carbon dioxide emissions allowances through quarterly auctions.173 RGGI thus assigns
a price to approximately eight percent of state-wide emissions from
all sectors; it ignores emissions from smaller electricity generators

170.
171.
172.
173.

tradable permits, or other instruments that will motivate such recognition.”).
An electricity importer’s emissions are calculated based on the annual emissions from each of its sources. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95812(c)(2)(B)
(2014).
Id. § 95852(b).
RGGI, Inc., RGGI, https://perma.cc/H3H4-MD2N.
Regulated Sources, RGGI, https://perma.cc/9TGG-9R2D [hereinafter RGGI,
Regulated Sources]. For a list of covered facilities in New York, see New
York: Facility Information, RGGI, https://perma.cc/BQ7F-KL4S [hereinafter
RGGI, New York: Facility Information].
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and electricity imports, as well as direct emissions from the industrial, transportation, or agricultural sectors.174
D. Proposals for Carbon Pricing in ISO/RTOs
Several ISO/RTOs have recently explored mechanisms that
would support the direct or indirect pricing of generation sources’
carbon intensity. The mechanisms and the reasons why they are
being considered are summarized in this part. One notable impetus for this exploration in NYISO, PJM, CAISO, and ISO-NE was
EPA’s adoption of the Clean Power Plan, which aimed at reducing
carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil fuel power plants.
The Trump Administration’s proposal to withdraw the Clean
Power Plan has raised questions about the direction each ISO/RTO
will take. While rescission of the Clean Power Plan would remove
a key driver for action nationwide and in New York, it would not,
from a legal perspective, directly affect ISO/RTOs’ authority to
adopt a carbon pricing scheme, which does not rely on EPA regulations. (This might change, should the Trump Administration and
Congress undo EPA’s 2009 Endangerment Finding and the various
regulatory authorities built upon it.175) For many ISO/RTOs, including NYISO, state-level policies (e.g., New York’s CES) will continue to drive interest in carbon pricing.
1. New York ISO
NYISO’s IPPP will assess “[w]hether a redesign is needed in
the wholesale market” and, in particular, whether and how to “internalize the cost of carbon” to improve market efficiency.176 The
IPPP was launched to “investigate potential market impacts from

174. LUCAS BIFERA, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 2 fig.1 (2013), https://perma.cc/9HCE-K6QB;
see also NYSERDA, NEW YORK STATE GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY AND
FORECAST: INVENTORY 1990-2011 AND FORECAST 2012-2030, UPDATED FINAL
REPORT S-2 (2015), https://perma.cc/Q76D-AQW8.
175. See Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC
Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 305 (2014)
(“In today’s dominant regulatory and policy paradigm, the environmental
consequences of electricity generation are ‘matters directly related to the
economic aspects’ of such transactions.”) (emphasis added).
176. DeSocio, supra note 147, at Slides 3, 5.
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the implementation of the [CES]”177 adopted by the NYPSC in August 2016.178 As part of the IPPP, NYISO will consider “[a]lternative market friendly approaches” to achieving the goals of the CES,
including carbon pricing.179
2. PJM Interconnection
An August 2016 PJM white paper put forward a mechanism
for reconciling two competing priorities in the PJM region:
1. states’ subsidies and price supports for renewable generation, which depress energy market prices; and
2. timely investments in new generation capacity, which rely
on signals sent by market price rises.180
That mechanism would involve a two-stage auction. In Stage 1,
subsidized resources and the demand they would serve (“related
demand”) would both be removed from the auction for the purpose
of determining capacity requirements for the relevant time period.181 The resources that clear the auction and the subsidized resources would both take on capacity commitments, all with identical performance requirements.182 Compensation for the subsidized
resources’ capacity commitments would be entirely the responsibility of their sponsoring state government; the related demand
would not have to pay.183 In Stage 2, subsidized resources would
be included in the auction, but at a reference price that approximates the unsubsidized cost for that resource type at the relevant
locational node.184 Any resource that fails to clear in Stage 1 would
not be eligible to receive compensation through the auction, even if
it bids into Stage 2 at a price below the second stage clearing
price.185
177. Id. at Slide 2.
178. Press Release, Governor of New York’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo Announces Establishment of Clean Energy Standard that Mandates 50 Percent
Renewables by 2030 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/8TLM-LQ64.
179. DeSocio, supra note 147, at Slide 5.
180. STU BRESLER, PJM INTERCONNECTION, POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO
EXPANDING THE MINIMUM OFFER PRICE RULE TO EXISTING RESOURCES 1
(2016), https://perma.cc/M7YG-7BWW.
181. Id. at 2.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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This two-stage process would not assign a price to carbon, but
would make it easier for states located in the PJM balancing area
to do so without disrupting the operation of the wholesale energy
or capacity markets.
3. California ISO
California’s legislature and governor have called for expansion
of CAISO to encompass other western states on the grounds that
such expansion will serve several goals, including lowering costs,
improving reliability, and supporting renewable energy development.186 That expansion would, however, mean departing from a
situation where the California Public Utility Commission and
CAISO largely share a geographic footprint that does not extend
beyond California’s borders. The new, expanded CAISO would
have to devise and manage a wholesale marketplace that spans
multiple states, only one of which assigns a price to GHG emissions. CAISO devised three possible mechanisms (“Options”) for
navigating this circumstance:
Compare the actual dispatch of electricity from particular
sources that serve load in California to weeks- or months-long
baselines, and thereby attribute estimated GHG emissions to particular sources based on the differences between actual and baseline dispatch;
1. Conduct quick (at five-minute intervals) two-step analyses
that first determine the most cost-effective regional dispatch of electricity and then attribute GHG emissions to
sources; or
2. Conduct a two-step analysis similar to Option 2, but rather
than mapping dispatch and attributing emissions with

186. California Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of 2015, c. 547 § 13
(2015) (amending Pub. Util. Code § 359.5 (a) to read: “It is the intent of the
Legislature to provide for the transformation of the Independent System
Operator into a regional organization . . . , and that the transformation
should only occur where it is in the best interests of California and its ratepayers.”); Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of Cal., to Cal. State
Legislature (Aug. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/68RM-KPDV; see also THE
BRATTLE GROUP ET AL., SENATE BILL 350 STUDY: THE IMPACTS OF A REGIONAL
ISO-OPERATED POWER MARKET ON CALIFORNIA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I-xiv
(2016), https://perma.cc/TVD8-8NVT (noting that demand for integration of
more renewables prompts need to expand).
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complete specificity (a computationally difficult task), impose either an averaged emissions factor or a residual
emissions rate (sometimes called a “hurdle rate”) on imported generation, making exceptions for generators party
to bilateral contracts with California LSEs.187
Of these, CAISO and the California Air Resources Board
(“CARB”) are now considering only Option 3.188 CAISO and CARB
raised concerns about Option 1 because CARB’s regulations would
not permit the crediting of emissions reductions involved.189 And
CAISO indicated that performing the quick calculations required
for Option 2 would exceed its computational capacity.190
4. ISO New England
The New England Power Pool (“NEPOOL”) initiated the Integrating Markets and Public Policy (“IMAPP”) stakeholder process
in August 2016 to explore options for decarbonizing the electric
grid without sacrificing reliability or market-based electricity price
formation.191 In addition to anticipating Clean Power Plan compliance measures, two other factors motivated IMAPP: first, natural
gas has dominated regional capacity additions to such an extent
since the late 1990s that ISO-NE is now susceptible to significant
adverse effects should there be a natural gas supply shock or price
187. G. ANGELIDIS & D. TRETHEWAY, CAL. ISO, REGIONAL INTEGRATION CALIFORNIA
GREENHOUSE GAS COMPLIANCE AND EIM GREENHOUSE GAS ENHANCEMENT
STRAW PROPOSAL 9–10 (2016), https://perma.cc/8EE6-8MEU; see also Northern California Power Agency, Comments on Regional GHG Compliance October 13 Technical Workshop 2–3 (Oct. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/2YCHMNJD (describing rate applied to out-of-state entities as a “hurdle rate”).
188. Don Tretheway, “Regional Integration-California Greenhouse Gas Compliance
Initiative–Second
Update,”
Slide
42
(Oct.
13,
2016),
https://perma.cc/4X4F-2YU2.
189. Id. at Slide 16.
190. Id. at Slide 18 (“[c]urrent computational power would require simplifying
(less accurate) first pass to ensure [real-time dispatch] successfully completes”).
191. NEW ENGLAND POWER POOL (“NEPOOL”), CHAIRMAN’S OPENING REMARKS,
NEPOOL IMAPP INITIATIVE 2 (2016), https://perma.cc/3PU4-8X5T (“Our
goal is to achieve and maintain our high standards for reliability that our
constituents demand, and to do so using the discipline of competition, while
incorporating the states’ goals of decarbonizing our industry over time.”) (emphasis added). IMAPP agendas, presentations, and white papers are all
posted online. See Integrating Markets and Public Policy, NEPOOL (2017),
https://perma.cc/8BX8-WLY7.
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jump;192 and second, wholesale market prices are artificially reduced by the inclusion of subsidized resources in capacity auctions,
which in turn distorts incentives for investment in new capacity.193
(All six states within ISO-NE’s territory provide for some form of
support for renewables.194)
Participants put forward fifteen different proposals, which fall
into four broad categories as follows:
1. introduction of a carbon pricing scheme, whereby a carbon
adder would be imposed on generators’ bids, reflecting
their carbon intensity;
2. changes to the forward capacity market such that certain
generators would receive payments for both their capacity
and their zero emission attributes;
3. introduction of a two-stage auction, similar to that proposed by PJM, which insulates wholesale market price formation from state policies; and
4. establishment of a Forward Clean Energy Market, in
which LSEs could procure long-term commitments (up to
ten years) for zero-emitting energy (not capacity) resources.
V.

NEW YORK’S EXISTING CARBON PRICING
POLICIES

New York has introduced not one but two partial carbon
prices, first by participating in RGGI, a cap-and-trade scheme, and
more recently with the NYPSC’s adoption of the CES. Both programs focus on the electricity sector but take different approaches
to price formation and leakage, i.e., out-of-state emissions that are
(i) not subject to restrictions or pricing and (ii) caused by in-state

192. ISO NEW ENGLAND, 2016 REGIONAL ELECTRICITY OUTLOOK 14 (2016),
https://perma.cc/K2TM-VS5A.
193. ISO NEW ENGLAND, THE IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMANCE-BASED CAPACITY
MARKET TO ENSURE RELIABILITY AS THE GRID ADAPTS TO A RENEWABLE
ENERGY FUTURE 5 (2015), https://perma.cc/Z5PQ-KJE7.
194. Gordon van Welie, ISO New England, “State of the Grid: ISO on Background,” Slide 30 (Jan. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/E4SQ-SPH5 (noting that
all six states impose RPSs); see also, e.g., Mass. H.B. 4568 (2016) (authorizing state agency to draft and execute PPAs for renewable generation); Conn.
Pub. Act No. 15-107 (same).
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electricity consumption.195 As described in this part, their approaches to prices and leakage have important legal implications.
A. RGGI
RGGI, the older of New York’s two carbon pricing programs,
requires New York’s seventy-six largest in-state fossil-fuel-fired
generators to purchase carbon dioxide emissions allowances.196
The legal basis for New York’s participation in RGGI is a set of
regulations adopted by the state Department of Environmental
Conservation (“DEC”) and Energy Research and Development Authority (“NYSERDA”).197 State regulations require covered generators to purchase carbon dioxide emissions allowances through
quarterly auctions.198 Auctions are conducted using a sealed bid

195. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41836, THE REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 14
(2016), https://perma.cc/ML6H-CFZL. A more general definition of leakage
is: an “increase in emissions by entities not subject to a regulation, due to
increases in costs for generators subject to the regulation.” Daniel Shawhan,
“Emission Reductions and ‘Leakage’ from US State Cap-and-Trade Programs,” Slide 5 (Sept. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/PEJ7-F9FL.
196. Generators with a capacity of 25MW or more are required to purchase allowances through RGGI. See RGGI, Regulated Sources, supra note 173. For
a list of covered facilities in New York, see RGGI, New York: Facility Information, supra note 173.
197. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 242 (2017) (DEC: CO2 Budget Trading
Program; requiring covered facilities to purchase allowances); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 507 (2017) (NYSERDA: CO2 Allowance Auction
Program; authorizing NYSERDA to coordinate New York facilities’ participation in auctions). Governor Pataki, along with the governors of other
RGGI states, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005. RGGI,
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2005), https://perma.cc/G6YQ-443U.
That document has no legal force and merely memorialized the governors’
commitments to pursue whatever was necessary for their respective states
to participate. See Thrun v. Cuomo, 976 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (App. Div. 3d
Dep’t 2013). The only legal challenge brought against New York’s participation in RGGI argued that (i) because it is effectively a tax, legislative approval is required; (ii) the Memorandum of Understanding is an unconstitutional interstate compact; and (3) the regulations themselves were arbitrary
and capricious and promulgated pursuant to an “error of law.” Id. at 323.
The court rejected all these arguments, which were raised well after the
four-month statute of limitations had run. Id. at 324.
198. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 242-1.4, 242-1.5(c).
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format in which each generator may submit multiple bids to purchase a specified number of allowances at different prices.199 Bids
are ranked by price, from high to low, and allowances issued until
cumulative demand equals supply.200 A region-wide declining cap
limits the number of allowances available for purchase.201 The cap
was set at 86.5 million allowances in 2016202 and will decline to 76
million allowances by 2020.203 Each allowance permits the holder
to emit one ton of carbon dioxide.
Because RGGI states impose a price on carbon dioxide emissions, in the form of an allowance cost, and the states around them
do not, the program is vulnerable to leakage. Like other RGGI
states, New York’s RGGI-implementing regulations do not currently seek to prevent leakage. Recent analyses of whether this
leakage tolerance has undermined RGGI’s carbon price conclude
that, to date, RGGI’s emissions pricing has increased imports,204
but that access to imports from relatively cheap natural gas-fired
generation in Pennsylvania and Ohio and hydropower in Québec
have meant a decrease in emissions nonetheless.205 Regardless of
199. RGGI, FACT SHEET: RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS (2017),
https://perma.cc/AKD6-V6B8.
200. RGGI, CO2 ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 10 (2016),
https://perma.cc/MP8D-R33N.
201. See generally RAMSEUR, supra note 195.
202. 2016 Allowance Allocation, RGGI (2016), https://perma.cc/6HM3-ZUFL.
203. For a discussion of the cap, see ELIZABETH A. STANTON ET AL., SYNAPSE
ENERGY ECONOMICS, THE RGGI OPPORTUNITY: RGGI AS THE ELECTRIC SECTOR
COMPLIANCE TOOL TO ACHIEVE 2030 STATE CLIMATE TARGETS 1–2 (2016),
https://perma.cc/D6T2-7UK7.
204. Harrison Fell & Peter Maniloff, Beneficial Leakage: The Effect of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on Aggregate Emissions 23–24 (Colo. Sch.
of Mines Div. of Econ. & Bus., Working Paper No. 2015-06, 2015),
https://perma.cc/543W-8V6X (identifying a 2451.95 gigawatt-hours per
month increase in imports into New York from PJM during RGGI’s implementation). But see ANDREW G. KINDLE ET AL., RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC
INST. & NYISO, AN EMPIRICAL TEST FOR INTER-STATE CARBON-DIOXIDE
EMISSIONS LEAKAGE RESULTING FROM THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE 19 (2011), https://perma.cc/MD2R-CYBS (finding no empirical evidence of leakage in Pennsylvania-New York electricity transmission data
from first year of RGGI’s operation).
205. Fell & Maniloff, supra note 204. Fell and Maniloff find that in regions that
export electricity to New York, RGGI’s carbon price seems to have prompted
capacity factor increases of ten to eleven percent by gas-fired generation
sources—but no increases by coal-fired sources. These have offset capacity
factor reductions of seven to ten percent by New York-based coal-fired generators. Id. at 17–18. See also RGGI, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRICITY

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/1

42

2017]

Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets

43

whether this fortuitous circumstance is likely to last, RGGI participants have committed to examining options for improving the
tracking of imports from outside RGGI and potentially adjusting
the prices assigned to those imports to prevent leakage.206
B. CES
New York’s CES, adopted by the NYPSC in August 2016, aims
by 2030 to reduce state-wide GHG emissions by forty percent from
a 1990 baseline.207 While this 40 by 30 goal applies economy-wide,
the bulk of emissions reductions are expected to come from the
electricity sector, with New York aiming to generate half of its electricity using renewable energy sources.208
The CES consists of three “tiers” of requirements for New York
LSEs209 but is more usefully understood as a combination of two
programs, one oriented to renewables (Tiers 1 and 2) and the other
(Tier 3) to three of the state’s four nuclear power plants. As explained below, neither program assigns a price directly to carbon,
but each assigns a price to “attributes” that include the non-emission of carbon.
CES Tiers 1 and 2 extend and modify the state’s existing RPS,
which required LSEs to collect a surcharge, payable to NYSERDA,
and authorized NYSERDA to acquire “RPS attributes,” embodied
in RECs, from renewable generators.210 This approach kept the
REC market separate from the market for electricity and also allowed NYSERDA to steer investments in utility-scale and smaller
renewable generation developments. Under the new CES Order,
LSEs can comply with the RPS by acquiring RECs from

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

GENERATION AND IMPORTS IN THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE:
2013 MONITORING REPORT 6–7 (2016), https://perma.cc/8KVD-QDGW (reporting net imports from PJM and Quebec).
See RGGI, RGGI 2012 PROGRAM REVIEW: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO
ACCOMPANY MODEL RULE AMENDMENTS 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/6DKKKQYX.
Case No. 15-E-0302, supra note 3.
N.Y. STATE ENERGY PLANNING BD., supra note 1, at 112.
NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 14–19.
For a description of the RPS first adopted in 2004, see 03-E-0188: Renewable
Portfolio Standard, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. (June 3, 2016),
https://perma.cc/6YTE-EPMV.
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NYSERDA, from renewable generators directly or by making “Alternative Compliance Payments” to NYSERDA.211 One qualifying
REC is “produced” alongside each MWh of electricity produced by
a renewable facility that began commercial operation after January 1, 2015.212 LSEs must acquire RECs in proportion to the annual load they supply—0.6 percent of load supplied in 2017, 1.1
percent in 2018, and up to 4.8 percent in 2021.213
CES Tier 3 requires LSEs to purchase ZECs “produced” by
three of the state’s four nuclear generating stations.214 As with the
RECs required to be purchased under Tiers 1 and 2, the Tier 3
ZECs place a value on a zero-emitting attribute and so are separate
from the electric energy sold by the nuclear generators. However,
three key alleged differences have led diverse parties to challenge
Tier 3 on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce
Clause (“dCC”) and is pre-empted by the FPA, namely:215
1. out-of-state generators cannot actually qualify to sell
ZECs, even if there is no formal mechanism preventing
them from doing so;
2. ZEC prices will be set by the NYPSC and limited by wholesale market prices; and
3. ZECs will soak up ratepayer spending in a way that is
likely to suppress wholesale capacity market prices.216
It appears that the Supreme Court’s recent Armstrong decision,
which held that “[t]he Supremacy Clause . . . does not create a
cause of action,”217 may well rescue the CES from challenges argu-

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 14–18, 94, 106–10.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 43.
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 35, Coalition
for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, No. 16-CV-8164, 2017 WL 3172866
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017).
216. See NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 108 (“For the
Year 2017 compliance period . . . [t]he REC price offered will equal the
weighted average cost per MWh NYSERDA paid to acquire the RECs to be
offered,” i.e., they will reflect the cost of developing and operating renewable
generation, “plus a reasonable Commission-approved adder to cover the administrative costs and fees incurred by NYSERDA to administer Tier 1.”).
217. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015); see
also Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951)
(holding that FPA does not provide for any private right of action); cf. Allco
Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (petitioner brought case via
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ing that it is pre-empted by the FPA. Thus, Tier 3’s chief legal danger relates to challenges rooted in the dCC.
VI. MECHANISMS OF A NYISO CARBON PRICING
SCHEME
Partly in response to adoption of the CES, NYISO launched
the IPPP to evaluate options to “achieve New York’s . . . decarbonisation goals at least cost,” consistent with the operation of wholesale markets.218 The focus is on “approaches that would internalize
the cost of carbon emissions” in markets.219 To that end, NYISO
could set a dollar value for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted during electricity generation (the “carbon price”), which would then be
used to calculate a carbon fee for each generating unit reflecting
its emissions profile. Ideally, this calculation would be based on the
generating unit’s actual emissions220 as follows:
Carbon fee ($ / MWh) = carbon price ($ / ton) × unit emissions (tons / MWh)
A carbon fee would be calculated for all in- and out-of-state generators bidding into energy markets administered by NYISO. While
the same carbon price would be applied to all units, regardless of
technology, the resulting carbon fee would vary depending on the
fuel used. Coal-fired generating units would face the highest carbon fee, followed by oil and then natural gas.
Each generating unit’s carbon fee would be added to its energy
market bid to produce a dispatch cost which NYISO would use to
determine the dispatch order. The likely effect would be a re-ordering of dispatch, with coal- and oil-fired generating units dispatched
less frequently and natural gas and renewable generators more
frequently, compared to the situation without a carbon fee (compare examples 1 and 2). The dispatch cost of the marginal generator would determine the market-clearing price. Generators would
receive that price less their carbon fee.
cause of action expressly granted by Congress for claims arising under
PURPA but not the FPA more generally).
218. DeSocio, supra note 147, at Slide 5.
219. Id.
220. In the alternative, the calculation could be based on the carbon intensity of
the fuel used by the generating facility and its heat rate. That is: carbon fee
= carbon price × fuel carbon intensity × heat rate.
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A. Setting the Carbon Price
Various technical issues will need to be considered in designing a carbon pricing scheme. Key among these is the level at which
to set the carbon price. As discussed in Part C above, carbon pricing
generally aims to internalize the external costs of carbon dioxide
emissions.221 While the New York public policy triad of RGGI,
RECs, and ZECs is based on multiple aims, at the root of all of
them is the reflection in market prices of the cost of GHG emissions, whether directly or in the form of a non-emitting attribute.
To estimate the costs imposed by GHG emissions, the Obama Administration developed the social cost of carbon (“SCC”), which reflects:
the economic damages associated with a small increase in carbon
dioxide . . . emissions, conventionally one metric ton, in a given
year . . . . [It] is meant to be a comprehensive estimate of the climate change damages and includes, among other things, changes
in agricultural productivity, human health, property damages
from increased flood risk and changes in energy system costs, such

221. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (2013, revised 2015), https://perma.cc/3NCG-6ZQT.
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as reduced costs for heating and increased costs for air conditioning.222

The SCC was calculated by an interagency working group, including representatives of EPA and other federal government
agencies, convened by the Obama Administration.223 In March
2017, the Trump Administration disbanded the interagency working group and rescinded the SCC, indicating that it should no
longer be used in federal policy making.224 However, it continues
to be used in many states, including New York, where the ZEC
price is based in part on the SCC.225
The SCC was calculated by quantifying the current and future
damage expected to result from one metric ton of carbon dioxide.226
That figure was then discounted back to present value to arrive at
the SCC.227 The interagency working group used three different
discount rates to calculate three SCCs shown in Table 1 below.228
Each SCC increases over time as the incremental impact of emissions rises in line with the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide.229

222. EPA, FACT SHEET: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/ZQC7DB43.
223. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS –
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 4 (2010), https://perma.cc/Z655-ZQE8.
224. Exec. Order No. 13,783, Promoting Energy Independent and Economic
Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
225. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 131.
226. EPA, supra note 222, at 1.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 3 (indicating that the “values are based on the average [SCC] from
three integrated assessment models, at discount rates of 5, 3, and 2.5 percent . . . [A] fourth value [was estimated based on] the 95th percentile of the
[SCC] from all three models at a 3 percent discount rate, and is intended to
represent the potential for higher-than-average damages”).
229. Id. at 1 (stating that the SCC “should increase over time because future
emissions are expected to produce larger incremental damages as physical
and economic systems become more stressed in response to greater levels of
climate change”).
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Table 1: SCC Calculated by the Federal Government230
SCC (2007 $ / metric ton)

Year in which
carbon dioxide emissions
occur

5% discount
rate

3% discount
rate

2.5% discount rate

2015

$11

$36

$56

2020

$12

$42

$62

2025

$14

$46

$68

2030

$16

$50

$73

2035

$18

$55

$78

2040

$21

$60

$84

2045

$23

$64

$89

2050

$26

$69

$95

The SCC was developed to assist federal agencies in performing cost-benefit analyses during rulemaking.231 There is, however,
support for its use in other contexts.232 It could be used by NYISO
to set the carbon price to be incorporated into bids in the wholesale

230. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 221, at 13.
231. EPA, supra note 222, at 1; see also Zero Zone Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
832 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding agency’s use of SCC in cost-benefit
analysis); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Hwy. Transp. Safety Bd., 538
F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding environmental review and requiring
agency to estimate cost imposed by GHG emissions).
232. See, e.g., High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F.
Supp. 3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014) (suggesting that the SCC could be used to
estimate the costs of increased carbon dioxide emissions in environmental
reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act). See also Michael
Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2017)
(discussing the possibility of using the SCC in environmental reviews); Sarah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon
Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 545–46 (2013) (noting that the EPA
has encouraged federal agencies to use the SCC in environmental reviews
under the National Environmental Policy Act).
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energy market. This would provide certainty for market participants, as the SCC is a robust metric, developed using technical
models, with input from multiple government departments and the
public. Recognizing this, in the context of ISO-NE’s IMAPP stakeholder process, electric utility Exelon Corporation has recommended using the SCC as the touchstone for pricing carbon in energy markets.233
Despite this support, it is worth noting that the SCC is not
universally accepted.234 Use of the SCC to price carbon in wholesale energy markets is likely to be opposed by some industry and
other groups on the basis that it does not merely reflect the costs
climate change imposes on electric grid operations but also includes various other costs (e.g., to the agricultural sector). Those
costs are, however, an externality of electricity generation. As we
explain in Part VII below, internalizing those external costs is necessary to enhance competition in wholesale electricity markets and
ensure that they operate effectively to produce just and reasonable
rates.
The SCC arguably provides the best metric for pricing the external costs of electricity generation’s carbon dioxide emissions.
The lowest SCC, calculated using a five-percent discount rate, is
consistent with the carbon prices currently used elsewhere in the
electricity sector. For example:
• It is below the implicit carbon price used by the EIA in calculating the levelized cost of electricity (“LCOE”). The
LCOE reflects the per-KWh cost of building and operating
an electric generating plant over an assumed financial life
and duty cycle, taking into account capital, operation,
maintenance, and financing costs.235 When calculating the
LCOE, the EIA includes a three-percent cost of capital ad-

233. Exelon Corporation, “Using Carbon Pricing in Dispatch to Meet the IMAPP
Process Goals,” Slide 1 (Aug. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/6RJQ-Q9K3.
234. For a discussion of opposition to the SCC, see Bruce Lieberman, Social Cost
of Carbon: A Continuing Little-Told Story, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS
(Sept. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/C49E-8Z47. See also David Malakoff et al.,
Trump Team Targets Changes to Key Metric that Calculates Social Cost of
Carbon, SCI. INSIDER (Dec. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/PKM5-6BVM.
235. EIA, LEVELIZED COST & LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION
RESOURCES
IN
THE
ANNUAL
ENERGY
OUTLOOK
1
(2016),
https://perma.cc/CS5S-83MA.
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der for carbon-intensive generating units, such as those using coal.236 The impact of this, according to the EIA, is
“similar to that of an emissions fee of $15 per metric ton of
carbon dioxide.”237
It is in line with the carbon price implicit in California’s
cap-and-trade program.238 As part of the cap-and-trade
program, California has adopted an allowance auction system, with a minimum or “reserve” price which functions as
a minimum carbon fee.239 That fee was $12.73 in 2016240
and will rise to $13.57 in 2017.241
It is in line with, and in some cases less than, the carbon
prices used internally by electric utilities. A number of utilities use a carbon price, for example, in their integrated
resource planning processes. These include Xcel Energy
Inc., which uses prices in the range of $9 to $34 per ton,
Sempra Energy, which uses a price of about $13 per ton,
NiSource Inc., which uses a price of $20 per ton, and
Ameren Corporation, which uses prices in the range of $23
to $54 per ton.242

236. The EIA asserts that the adder is necessary as, “[b]ecause regulators and
the investment community have continued to push energy companies to invest in technologies that are less greenhouse gas-intensive, there is considerable financial risk associated with major investments in long-lived power
plants with a relatively higher rate of carbon dioxide emissions.” Id. at 3.
237. EIA, LEVELIZED COST & LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION
RESOURCES
IN
THE
ANNUAL
ENERGY
OUTLOOK
3
(2014),
https://perma.cc/L8SK-CKEQ.
238. See supra Part 3.
239. Auction Information, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://perma.cc/27HD-2CTG (discussing the auction reserve price which establishes the minimum at which
allowances will be sold).
240. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM AND QUÉBEC CAPAND-TRADE SYSTEM: 2016 ANNUAL AUCTION RESERVE PRICE NOTICE 1 (2015),
https://perma.cc/NC69-2SQW.
241. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM AND QUÉBEC CAPAND-TRADE SYSTEM: 2017 ANNUAL AUCTION RESERVE PRICE NOTICE 1 (2016),
https://perma.cc/7TG7-A57V.
242. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT (“CBD”), PUTTING A PRICE ON RISK: CARBON
PRICING IN THE CORPORATE WORLD 62 (2015), https://perma.cc/B4R2-7ZDP.
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Given the above, NYISO may elect to use the lowest SCC, calculated using a discount rate of five percent, to mitigate cost impacts. That would result in an initial carbon price of $12.82.243
B. Carbon Price Adjustment
Economists generally agree that carbon prices should rise over
time to reflect the fact that, as more carbon accumulates in the
atmosphere, the incremental damage caused by one additional ton
increases.244 Consistent with this view, the SCC rises steadily from
$11 in 2015 to $21 in 2040 and to $26 in 2050 (see Table 1 above).
At the time of establishing a carbon pricing scheme, NYISO
should adopt procedures specifying when and how price adjustments will be made. Ideally, to maximize certainty and predictability for the private sector, adjustments should be made at predefined intervals. NYISO could, for example, adjust prices every five
years in line with the SCC. Assuming NYISO elects to use the lowest SCC (i.e., calculated using a five-percent discount rate), this
would result in a modest increase in carbon prices over the next
two decades, mitigating the impact on costs.
C. Interaction with Other Carbon Prices
1. Interaction with RGGI
Some electric generators bidding into NYISO markets are already subject to carbon pricing through RGGI. It is important that
any NYISO carbon pricing scheme avoid requiring generators—directly or indirectly—to pay twice for the same emissions (i.e., once
to comply with the NYISO MST and once to comply with RGGI).
The RGGI price should, therefore, be deducted from whatever carbon price NYISO adds to covered generators’ bids. The CES, which
confronts the same problem when deriving a ZEC price, solves it
by subtracting two values from the SCC. The first is a fixed projection of the RGGI price, borrowed from NYISO’s CARIS model,
which anticipates patterns of and costs arising from transmission
243. The 2015 SCC value, calculated using a five-percent discount rate, is $11 in
2007. After adjusting for inflation, that is equivalent to $12.82 in 2016 dollars.
244. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, The Promise and Problems of
Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience, 21 J. ENV’T & DEV. 152, 155 (2012).
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grid congestion.245 The second value is a hybrid of independent
forecasts of NYISO’s energy and capacity markets whose projections capture anticipated changes to RGGI’s carbon price.246
2. Interaction with New York’s CES
FERC has determined that it does not have jurisdiction over
markets for RECs unbundled from markets for energy or capacity.247 Thus, Tiers 1 and 2 of New York’s CES can operate in parallel with a wholesale market carbon price without legal consequence. Tier 3, however, establishes a ZEC price that is both
derived from the SCC and constrained by NYISO energy market
prices.248 Some of the litigants in the current dispute over New
York’s CES argue that these features make the ZEC price potentially subject to FERC’s jurisdiction (see Part 5.2 above), as well as
logically duplicative of any carbon price based on the SCC. Consequently, if NYISO’s carbon price were to derive from the SCC, then
NYISO and the NYPSC would have to decide which price would
accommodate or displace the other. Otherwise, given their common
goal (correcting electricity prices to better reflect the value of avoiding the adverse effects of climate change), both would impose costs
that, combined, exceed the value they aim to approximate, namely
a version of the SCC. This logical failing would be legally problematic as well because it would belie the argument that the carbon
pricing scheme improves wholesale price formation by more accurately incorporating costs that are relevant but were heretofore ignored.249
Ultimately, either accommodating or displacing Tier 3 of the
CES would mean applying a carbon price more or less uniformly to
all the generation sources subject to NYISO’s tariff. The key differences between the two approaches would relate to implementation.
Accommodation would mean crafting a new mechanism that alters
245. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 57, 131, 135–36.
246. Those forecasts pertain to Zone A, where no nuclear facilities are located.
This lowers ZEC prices at times when electricity prices are expected to increase.
247. WSPP, Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061, 61,425 (Apr. 20, 2012) (clarifying that
FERC has jurisdiction over bundled REC and energy transactions, but not
over unbundled REC-only transactions).
248. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 131 & 150.
249. See infra Part VII.
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non-nuclear generator bid prices, operates alongside the CES, and
leaves the ZEC prices paid to three nuclear generators undisturbed. Displacement would mean eliminating Tier 3 and simply
modifying the bid prices of all generators based on the carbon content of their fuel. Practically, displacement would be far simpler;
politically, both are fraught.
D. Likely Effect on Wholesale Electricity Prices
Adoption of a carbon pricing scheme by NYISO will, in the
short run, likely lead to an increase in the market-clearing price of
electricity. The amount of that increase will depend on the carbon
dioxide emissions profile of the marginal generator, since, as described above, prices will be set equal to that generator’s bid plus
a carbon fee based on its emissions. Average emissions from various classes of generating units are shown in Table 2. Based on
those averages and assuming a carbon price of $12.82,250 the table
shows the carbon fee for each class of generator.
Table 2: Estimated Carbon Fee for Fossil Fuel Generators
Generating
Resource

Average Emissions Rate251
(per MWh)

Carbon Fee252
(per MWh)

Coal – Lignite

1.09 tons

$13.97

Coal – Subbituminous

1.08 tons

$13.85

Coal – Bituminous

1.04 tons

$13.33

Oil – Residual (No. 6)

0.88 tons

$11.28

Oil – Residual (No. 2)

0.82 tons

$10.51

Natural Gas

0.61 tons

$7.82

250. See supra Part A.
251. EIA, supra note 152 (estimating the number of pounds of carbon dioxide
produced per KWh of electricity generated, based on the average heat rates
for steam electric generators in 2014).
252. Calculated assuming a carbon price of $12.82 per ton.
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Currently, in NYISO markets, natural-gas-fired resources are
the marginal source of supply in most intervals.253 It is unclear
whether that will remain the case after introduction of a carbon
pricing scheme. We anticipate some reordering of resources but
cannot determine exactly how the supply mix will change and/or
whether gas will remain at the margin. This will depend on a number of factors, including each generator’s cost and emissions profile,
as shown in simplified example 2 above. Further complicating matters, there will likely also be a demand response, which affects dispatch. For example, if higher prices reduce electricity demand,
fewer generating units may need to be dispatched, leading to a
change in the marginal unit.254
In intervals when natural gas is at the margin, the marketclearing price would increase by around $8 (per MWh), depending
on the marginal generator’s actual emissions. Should coal be at the
margin, the market clearing price increase would be around $14
(per MWh). Each generator would receive the market-clearing
price less their carbon fee. Thus, as the carbon fee is highest for
fossil fuel generators, there would be an incentive to increase investment in renewable and other low-carbon generation. In the
long run, the market-clearing price may decrease as the generating
fleet becomes less carbon intensive and low- and zero-emitting generators are increasingly on the margin. Such a decrease could be
partially or wholly offset by increases in the carbon price. Such increases could cause the market-clearing price to rise over time.
E. Options for Re-distributing Revenues
To offset increased wholesale electricity prices, revenues generated through the carbon pricing scheme should be reimbursed to
LSEs and other buyers in an equitable manner. This could be
achieved in several ways. One option is to require LSEs to pay the
full market-clearing price, including the amount of any carbon fee.
Each generator would receive that price, less their unit specific carbon fee, which would be retained by NYISO. The retained funds
could then be equitably refunded to LSEs. States could direct LSEs
253. PATTON ET AL., supra note 67, at 7 (indicating that natural gas-fired resources were the marginal source of supply in 67 percent of intervals in 2013
and 2015).
254. For a discussion of this issue, see Jos Sijm et al., CO2 Cost Pass-Through
and Windfall Profits in the Power Sector, 6 CLIMATE POL’Y 49 (2006).
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to use the refunded amount to mitigate end-customer bill impacts
or fund state policy goals (e.g., energy efficiency investments).
Studies suggest that, where the refunds are passed through to customers, any increase in retail bills is likely to be minimal. By way
of example, Exelon estimated an increase in retail bills of just one
to two percent, assuming a carbon price of $20 per ton.255 Another
study for the Clean Air Task Force estimated that, with a carbon
price of $34 per ton, retail rates would increase by 4.1 percent.256
Ideally, refunds to LSEs should not be tied to their specific
purchases in energy markets to avoid dampening any demand response.257 NYISO could, for example, provide periodic refunds
based on each LSE’s share of total load during the period. Refunds
would not be tied to LSEs’ actual share of carbon fees, meaning
that all LSEs would receive the same amount per MWh of electricity purchased, regardless of whether purchases are made during
times of low or high fees.
Similar refund schemes have been adopted by ISO/RTOs in
other circumstances. For instance, since 2007, PJM has included
the marginal cost of transmission line losses in energy market
prices.258 As marginal losses rise exponentially with transmission
system flows, they exceed average losses, resulting in PJM overcollecting revenues relative to costs.259 PJM refunds the excess to
buyers on a monthly basis, in proportion to each buyer’s MW usage

255. Assuming that the revenues from the carbon price were applied to retail bill
relief programs. See Exelon Corporation, Comments of Exelon Corporation
on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources 19, 33 (Dec. 1, 2014),
https://perma.cc/EK3C-3DPP.
256. BRUCE PHILLIPS, THE NORTHBRIDGE GRP., ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR
REGULATING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING POWER PLANTS
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: PRACTICAL PATHWAYS TO MEANINGFUL
REDUCTIONS 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/2QXX-MP33.
257. See supra Part D.
258. Atlantic City Electric Co. v. PJM Interconnection, 115 FERC ¶ 61,132,
61,474 (May 1, 2006). For a discussion of this decision and its relevance to
carbon pricing in wholesale electricity markets, see STEVEN WEISSMAN &
ROMANY WEBB, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF LAW, ADDRESSING
CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION: HOW THE FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION CAN USE ITS EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REDUCE
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND INCREASE CLEAN ENERGY USE 10–11 (2014),
https://perma.cc/LFV6-DZ3K.
259. Atlantic City Electric Co., 115 FERC at ¶ 61,478.
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rather than its actual contribution to the surplus funds.260 A similar marginal loss collection and refund scheme is used by
CAISO.261 FERC has approved both the CAISO and PJM schemes;
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
upheld FERC’s approval of the PJM scheme.262
As an alternative to collecting and then refunding carbon fees,
ISO/RTOs could adjust the electricity prices paid by LSEs and
other buyers to reflect the market-clearing price less the average
carbon fee for all dispatched generators (see example 3 below). This
approach would dampen the demand response to the carbon pricing scheme, as LSEs would face a lower price compared to when
the adder is collected by NYISO. It is, however, likely to be simpler
to administer than the refund schemes described above.
F. Monitoring and Reporting
To successfully implement a carbon pricing scheme, data will
be required on each generator’s carbon dioxide emissions to calculate the carbon fee to be added to its bids. The required data is
already recorded in the New York Generator Attribute Tracking
System (“NYGATS”). Maintained by NYSERDA, NYGATS tracks
the environmental attributes of electricity generated within New
York as well as that imported to the state.263 For each MWh of
electricity, NYGATS records the generation source (whether in or
out of state) and key characteristics of that source, including its
carbon dioxide emissions rate.264 The emissions data is entered by
NYISO, based on reports filed by generators participating in its
market.

260. Atlantic City Electric Co., v. PJM Interconnection, 117 FERC ¶ 61,169
(2006).
261. California Independent System Operator, 116 FERC ¶ 61,274 (Sept. 21,
2006), order on reh’g, 119 FERC ¶ 61,076 (Apr. 20, 2007).
262. Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 2013). FERC’s
approval of the CAISO scheme was not appealed to the courts.
263. New York Generation Attribute Tracking System (NYGATS), NYSERDA,
https://perma.cc/V5KH-79WW. See also NYSERDA, “New York Generation
Attribute Tracking System (NYGATS) Stakeholder Meeting,” Slide 8 (Apr.
13, 2017), https://perma.cc/G9BR-WA4E.
264. Id. at Slide 14.
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VII. DOES THE LAW PERMIT NYISO TO PRICE
CARBON?
Any NYISO carbon pricing scheme would be subject to FERC
review. As explained in Part C above, under the FPA, FERC is responsible for overseeing wholesale electricity rates to ensure that
they are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. The FPA requires public utilities, including ISO/RTOs, to
submit to FERC proposed changes to their rates or practices affecting rates.265
FERC has traditionally shown great deference to ISO/RTOs to
formulate market rules as they see fit.266 FERC may approve an
amended NYISO tariff establishing new market rules, without
finding that the existing tariff is deficient or that the amended tariff is somehow superior.267 The applicable standard requires only
that the amended tariff be just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
A. Including a Carbon Price in Wholesale Electricity
Rates is Just and Reasonable
This sub-part presents two distinct lines of argument supporting the conclusion that carbon pricing in NYISO markets is just
and reasonable. The first is the bolder of the two and builds on the
premise that FERC has wide latitude to authorize a NYISO proposal aimed at improving the functioning of its wholesale markets.
The second resembles arguments made elsewhere for adopting a
wholesale carbon price: it reflects and rationalizes state public policy. As noted in the introduction, though these arguments are distinct from one another, they are not mutually exclusive. Importantly, these arguments are intended to justify inclusion of a
carbon price of some sort in NYISO’s tariff and do not address the
level at which any such price should be set. That issue is discussed
in Part 3 below.

265. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d).
266. Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of
the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 555 (2007).
267. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d).
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1. Argument 1: Improving the Functioning of Wholesale
Markets Administered by NYISO
Argument 1(a): A carbon price would enhance competition in NYISO markets. As discussed in Part C above, FERC considers rates to be just and reasonable if they are set in well-functioning, competitive wholesale energy markets. FERC regulates
markets to mitigate the exercise of market power and otherwise
enhance competition, viewing such regulatory intervention as “integral to . . . fulfilling its statutory mandate under the FPA to ensure supplies of electric energy at just [and] reasonable” prices.268
FERC put this premise to the test in 2011 when, in Order 745,269
it required ISO/RTOs to pay the full LMP to qualifying demandresponse resources on the grounds that promoting “meaningful demand-side participation” in wholesale markets would increase
competition in those markets with salutary effects on prices.270
The Supreme Court ultimately endorsed FERC’s logic in FERC v.
Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”).271
In upholding Order 745, the Court in EPSA noted that FERC
“undertakes to ensure just and reasonable wholesale rates by enhancing competition—attempting . . . to break down regulatory
and economic barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale electricity.”272 The Court emphasized that Order 745 is intended “to
improve how [the wholesale energy] market runs.”273 According to
the Court, FERC’s “justifications for regulating demand response
are all about, and only about, improving the wholesale market. . . .
FERC explained that demand response participation could help
create a ‘well-functioning competitive’” market with reduced rates
and enhanced reliability.274
The decision in EPSA suggests that FERC has broad authority
to promote competition in wholesale markets as a means to ensure
just and reasonable rates. Based on EPSA, at least two commentators have suggested that FERC could approve an ISO/RTO268. Order No. 745, Fed. Reg. 16,657, 16,659–60, 16,676 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
269. Id. at 16,659.
270. Id.
271. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2015).
272. Id. at 768.
273. Id. at 776.
274. Id. at 776–77.
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proposed carbon price as just and reasonable, so long as evidence
demonstrates that the adder would enhance competition.275
Peskoe, who makes this argument in relation to ISO-NE, emphasizes that FERC’s approval “may be on more solid legal ground” if
the adder is designed to achieve specific competitive outcomes independent of the environmental harm caused by carbon dioxide
emissions.276 Thus, Peskoe stops short of endorsing what has been
called “social-cost dispatch”—the adjustment of market-based
rates so that they reflect social costs rather than private ones.277
Weissman and Webb, writing before the EPSA decision, argued that including the social cost of carbon dioxide emissions in
rates is necessary to enhance competition in wholesale markets:
[L]ess-polluting generators are placed at a competitive disadvantage when more-polluting generators can mask the true cost of
power by ignoring externalities . . . The existence of environmental
externalities represents [a] kind of market failure to which FERC
could . . . respond by adjusting the bid price . . . [In doing so,
FERC’s] objective would be to stimulate the development of generating units that will impose the lowest cost on society and remove
[a] market distortion—the ability of some generators to undercut
their competitors by escaping responsibility for their environmental costs.278

This reasoning takes the characterization of environmental externalities as being outside of FERC’s remit and stands it on its head.
By Weissman and Webb’s logic, ignoring environmental externalities means giving some market participants an unfair competitive

275. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1788 (2016) (“[FERC] can even take
an ‘environmental’ action—such as addressing climate change through a
carbon adder—if it has a direct relationship to wholesale rates.”); Ari
Peskoe, Integrating Markets and Public Policy in New England 9 (Oct, 27,
2016) (discussion draft), https://perma.cc/MWY8-FQDK (stating that FERC
could approve a carbon adder if it “can conclude that there is adequate support in the record that [the] proposal furthers that goal” of enhancing competition).
276. Peskoe, supra note 275, at 28.
277. Bateman & Tripp, supra note 175, at 330.
278. WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 258, at 4, 6.
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advantage over others and thereby impairing market competitiveness.279 This view sees an analogy between compensating emitting
and non-emitting generators at the same rate and compensating
generation and demand response at different rates. FERC Order
745 eliminated the latter distinction on the grounds that inadequate compensation inhibited wholesale market participation by
demand response resources, which, in turn, kept average rates
higher than necessary and, more generally, reduced competition in
wholesale energy markets. In the case of a carbon price, FERC
would be acting to facilitate the participation of low-carbon generators that, like demand response resources, are inadequately compensated for the services they provide because rates do not reflect
their zero-emission attributes. Adopting a carbon price would ensure that rates more accurately reflect the value that low- and
high-carbon electricity sources deliver and, thus, level the competitive playing field.
Another, more recent example of FERC action to enhance competition in wholesale markets is its draft order on electric storage
resources’ participation in wholesale markets.280 That draft order
pertains to a wide array of storage technologies (fly wheels, batteries, compressed air, and others) capable of charging and discharging electricity.281 According to FERC, this capability “provides
[storage] resources with significant operational flexibility,” enabling them to deliver various grid services.282 Currently, however,
storage resources’ participation in wholesale markets is limited by
the fact that they “often must use existing participation models designed for traditional generation or load resources.”283 FERC’s
draft order seeks to adjust the parameters that wholesale markets
use to determine resource participation and valuation to better
capture evident but unrealized benefits to market participants:
279. See Bateman & Tripp, supra note 175, at 304 (“[B]y not incorporating GHG
externalities into its rate regulation, FERC influences decisions about what
generation should be built just as much as it would by incorporating these
externalities. The effect of its exclusion of the externalities is simply to give
GHG-intensive generation, such as coal, an advantage vis-à-vis cleaner energy, such as wind.”).
280. See Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg.
86,522 (Nov. 17, 2016) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
281. Id. at 86,525.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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We take action in this NOPR so that electric storage resources will
be able to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets
to the extent they are technically capable of doing so based on rules
that take into account their unique characteristics and not based
on market rules designed for the unique characteristics of other
types of resources . . . Current tariffs that do not recognize the operational characteristics of electric storage resources serve to limit
the participation of electric storage resources in the organized
wholesale electric markets and result in inefficient use of these resources.284

FERC’s instructions to ISO/RTOs to revise their participation models are technology-neutral and recognize the indispensable role of
aggregators in integrating storage technologies meaningfully into
grid operations.285 Their objective is straightforward: level the
competitive playing field for technologies with a particular capability—i.e., “receiving electric energy from the grid and storing it
for later injection of electricity back to the grid regardless of where
the resource is located on the electrical system”—that has to date
been undervalued.286 The approach to NYISO carbon pricing proposed here would also improve wholesale markets’ valuation of a
particular capability or attribute, namely low- or non-emitting
electricity generation.
The playing field is particularly skewed in NYISO markets,
which are affected not only by the current failure to internalize
carbon externalities at the wholesale level but also by state policies
adopted in more or less direct response to that failure. The policies,
described in Part V above, effectively attach a value to generators’
carbon-related attributes. They do not, however, apply equally to
all generators with the same attributes. Just 76 of New York’s
roughly 170 fossil fuel generators have their carbon dioxide emissions priced through RGGI.287 Some low-carbon generators that
operate renewable energy sources are compensated for their zero-

284.
285.
286.
287.

Id.
Id. at 86,523–24.
Id. at 86,525.
Generators with a capacity of 25MW or more are required to purchase allowances through RGGI. See RGGI, Regulated Sources, supra note 173. For
a list of covered facilities in New York, see RGGI, New York: Facility Information, supra note 173.
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emission attributes through REC sales.288 Such compensation is
not, however, consistently available to non-renewable low-carbon
generators.289 Finally, three, but not all four, of the state’s nuclear
generators receive compensation from ZEC sales which is not
available to renewable generators.290
Due to their partial application, state policies provide only incomplete and inchoate remedies for the market failure described
above and arguably further distort the market, thereby impairing
effective competition among wholesale buyers and sellers. The policies give some market participants a competitive advantage over
others with the same attributes. RGGI, for example, increases the
costs faced by large fossil fuel generators due to the need to purchase emission allowances. Those generators are, therefore, forced
to bid into the market at higher prices. Smaller fossil fuel generators (i.e., that are not subject to RGGI) can, however, continue
making bids that exclude the cost of emissions and, thus, undercut
their competitors.291 Similarly, as a result of the CES, nuclear
power plants can undercut fossil fuel and other generators. The
CES increases the return nuclear power plants receive for electricity sold in wholesale markets, creating an incentive for them to reduce their bids (i.e., to ensure they are dispatched), thereby putting
downward pressure on market prices. This is likely to affect the
financial viability of other generators, both low- and high-carbon,
impeding their ongoing participation in wholesale markets.
We note that some commentators have disputed FERC’s authority to adjust wholesale market prices to internalize the external costs of carbon dioxide emissions.292 Moot, for example, has argued that such costs are fundamentally extrinsic to wholesale
markets and, thus, beyond FERC’s legal domain.293 He states:

288. NYPSC Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 3, at 16, Appendix A (indicating that RECs may be produced and sold by resources that came into
operation after January 1, 2015 and use certain renewable resources to generate electricity).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 128 (indicating that the FitzPatrick, Ginna, and Nine Mile Point nuclear generators will be eligible to receive ZEC payments).
291. This is because smaller generators, with a capacity less than 25MW, are not
required to purchase allowances through RGGI. See RGGI, Regulated
Sources, supra note 173.
292. See, e.g., Moot, supra note 9.
293. Id. at 358–61.
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FERC can remove barriers to participation by renewable resources
in wholesale power markets . . . if those barriers constitute an undue preference. That preference must relate to a matter within
FERC’s jurisdiction, however, not a matter committed to the jurisdiction of other governmental bodies. Just as the FERC cannot
remedy perceived inequities in the tax code by withholding wholesale market revenues from firms allegedly taking advantage of tax
loopholes, it cannot counteract Congress’ failure to enact cap-andtrade or carbon tax legislation by creating its own program
through a wholesale market design change.294

In our view, however, FERC approval of a NYISO carbon price
would not amount to an extension of environmental policy by other
means. Rather, it would be a logical application of the principles
that have long guided FERC’s management of wholesale markets.
While we agree with Moot that neither the FPA nor other federal
legislation expressly authorizes FERC to address emissions, that
would not be FERC’s primary purpose in approving a carbon price.
FERC’s purpose would be to enhance wholesale market operations
and promote competition, much as it has done in other instances
where it has lacked express legislative sanction but has proceeded
anyway.295
Argument 1(b): A carbon pricing scheme would ensure
proper wholesale price formation. In considering FERC’s authority to approve a carbon pricing scheme following EPSA, it is
important to bear in mind the features of Order 745. Most notably,
as the Supreme Court observed, the order “is all about” reducing
wholesale electricity prices.296 In contrast, a carbon pricing scheme
is likely to increase wholesale electricity prices, at least in the short
run.297 In the long run, however, prices should fall as the generating fleet becomes less carbon intensive.298 In contrast, from the
start, the costs of generation will likely fall. While electricity prices
294. Id. at 361.
295. See supra Part A.
296. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2015). As noted above, Order 745 aims to promote
the participation of demand-response resources in wholesale markets by
compensating them at the full LMP. Such compensation is, however, only
required where resources pass a net benefits test indicating that their dispatch will result in lower wholesale prices (i.e., compared to if all load was
met with generation).
297. See supra Part D.
298. Id.
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and costs are often assumed to be equivalent,299 in fact, costs currently exceed prices due to the presence of externalities. These externalities reflect a cost to society—one that, in our view, must be
incorporated into prices if they are to provide clear signals to market participants and investors.
FERC has recently emphasized the importance of proper price
formation to, among other things, maximize market surplus and
incentivize investment.300 According to FERC Commissioner
Cheryl LaFleur, to achieve these objectives, prices must “reflect the
true cost of reliable operations.”301 The near-term effects of climate
change—warmer ambient temperatures, heat waves, less reliable
access to water, and more frequent and intense storms—have clear
import for system reliability. These effects will impair generation
and transmission facility efficiency,302 undermining reliability and
creating costs, which must be reflected in prices to provide correct

299. In EPSA, the court uses the terms “price” and “cost” interchangeably. Compare EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 778 (indicating that “wholesale market operators
accept demand response bids only if those offers lower the wholesale price”
(emphasis added)), with id. at 782 (stating operators will accept a bid “so
long as that bid can satisfy a ‘net benefits test’—meaning that it is sure to
bring down costs” (emphasis added)).
300. Price Formation in Energy and Ancillary Services Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators; Notice Inviting Post-Technical Workshop Comments, 80 Fed. Reg. 3,580 (Jan.
23, 2015).
301. FERC, TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: PRICE FORMATION IN ENERGY AND AUXILIARY
SERVICES MARKETS OPERATED BY REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS
AND INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATORS 6 (2014), https://perma.cc/YAM8L6FE.
302. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 10 (2013), https://perma.cc/62TQ-VUCN
(indicating that, in natural gas and coal units, “heat is used to produce highpressure steam, which is expanded over a turbine to produce electricity. The
driving force for the process is the phase change of the steam to a liquid
following the turbine . . . A vacuum is created in the condensation process
that draws the steam over the turbine. This low pressure is critical to the
thermodynamic efficiency of the process. Increased backpressure will lower
the efficiency of the generation process. Increases in ambient air temperatures and cooling water temperatures will increase steam condensate temperatures and turbine backpressure, reducing power generation efficiency.”); see also Order Approving Electric, Gas and Steam Rate Plans in
Accord with Joint Proposal, Case No. 13-E-0030 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
Feb. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/RCU5-ZKQS; SOFIA AIVALIOTI, SABIN CTR.
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, ELECTRICITY SECTOR ADAPTATION TO HEAT WAVES
(2015), https://perma.cc/93FG-8NHF.
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incentives for investment in new facilities. Put another way: climate change is imposing costs on the electric grid and its end users
that wholesale markets currently interpret as noise rather than
signal; carbon pricing would serve to translate that signal into
price effects and thereby more accurately reflect the value that
high- and low-carbon sources of electricity deliver.
FERC has recently taken steps to ensure that market prices
more fully account for the cost of generation. In Order 825, for example, FERC directed market operators to implement various reforms aimed at ensuring that prices more accurately reflect energy
and reserve shortages303 so that generators “are compensated for
the value of the service that they provide” and, thus, face the correct incentives to invest in enhancing reliability.304 While Order
825 relates to the pricing of features endogenous to wholesale markets, FERC has also dealt with exogenous features in the past.
FERC has previously adjusted wholesale market prices to achieve
public policy objectives such as reduced transmission line losses.305
In 2006, FERC ordered PJM to include an uplift charge—equal to
the marginal cost of line losses—in wholesale prices to cover the
cost of energy lost during transmission. According to Weissman
and Webb:
FERC’s decision to require marginal loss pricing was made on policy grounds and aimed to ensure that prices provide the strongest
signal possible to encourage more efficient use of the transmission
system . . . FERC emphasized that use of this methodology would
reduce electricity supply costs and thereby increase electricity
market efficiency [stating]: “by changing to the marginal losses
method, PJM would change the way that it dispatches generators

303. FERC noted that “some RTOs/ISOs currently restrict the use of shortage
pricing to certain causes of shortages, or some RTOs/ISOs require a shortage
to exist for a minimum amount of time before triggering shortage pricing.”
See Order No. 825, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,881, 42,894 (June 30, 2016) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35). FERC determined that “existing shortage pricing triggers
that do not invoke shortage pricing when there is a shortage (regardless of
duration or cause) are unjust and unreasonable.” Id. FERC therefore required “each RTO/ISO to trigger shortage pricing for any interval in which
a shortage of energy or operating reserves is indicated.” Id. at 42,900.
304. Id. at 42,884.
305. For a discussion of this issue, see WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 258, at 10–
11.
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by considering the effects of [transmission line] losses. As a result . . . the total cost of meeting load would be reduced.”306

Just as line losses create a burden for buyers and sellers of electricity, justifying market rule adjustments, so too do carbon dioxide
emissions and associated climate change. Both lead to reduced system reliability and, thus, increased costs for market participants.
Adopting a carbon price would internalize the external costs of
emissions, ensuring that they are taken into account by market
operators when dispatching generators, and thereby causing electricity demand to be served by the lowest cost resources.
2. Argument 2: Ensuring orderly development of the
electric system
Argument 2(a): Wholesale carbon pricing reflective of
diverse state policies would, in the short run, harmonize
those policies. As discussed in Part C, in exercising its authority
to set just and reasonable rates, FERC must balance the interests
of suppliers and customers.307 FERC must also ensure protection
of the public interest.308 This does not, however, give FERC “a
broad license to promote the general public welfare.”309 Rather, as
the Supreme Court has observed, it “is a charge to promote the orderly production of plentiful supplies of electric energy” at reasonable prices.310 Achieving this goal in the age of climate change
means ensuring that prices provide appropriate signals for investment in low-carbon generation consistent with state policy.311 In
the short run, this means rationalizing the current patchwork of
carbon-related electricity pricing policies in New York. In the long
run, it means ensuring that market participants align their plans
306. Id. (internal citations omitted).
307. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
308. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355
(1956) (declaring that “the purpose of the power given the Commission by
§ 206(a) [i.e., to set just and reasonable rates] is the protection of the public
interest”).
309. NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1972).
310. Id. at 670.
311. See generally TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURES (2016), https://perma.cc/W45A-NH47 (characterizing categories of investment risk arising from climate change).
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with existing and foreseeable future legal requirements.312
Some but not all NYISO market participants are subject to
state policies aimed at supporting the transition to low-carbon electricity generation. As discussed in Part 1 above, the patchwork of
state policies provides partial coverage of New York generators
with respect to carbon emissions. It also imposes diverse price levels on those emissions or their absence: REC values derive from an
independent market whose participants must comply with the
state’s RPS; ZEC values derive from a formula derived from the
SCC; and RGGI allowance prices derive from an interstate allowance-trading market. As of January 2017, REC purchasers paid
$21.16 per MWh,313 ZEC purchasers $17.54 per MWh,314 and
RGGI participants $3.55 per short ton of carbon dioxide,315 which
translates to about $2.17/MWh for natural-gas-fired generators
and $3.67 for bituminous-coal-fired ones.316
Partial coverage and diverse pricing complicates and distorts
the values transmitted via wholesale electricity markets to participants, thereby impairing efficient planning and investment. This
situation is ripe for improvement via the sort of rationalization
that a more uniformly applicable wholesale carbon price would provide.
Argument 2(b): Wholesale carbon pricing reflective of
state-level public policy would improve long-run planning.
A harmonizing wholesale carbon price would also help ensure orderly electric system development over the long term. New York
policymakers responsible for the electric grid have long recognized
the need to mitigate climate change and have embodied that goal
in a variety of policies. Achieving the state’s climate change mitigation goals, such as the 40 by 30 goal, will require replacing a
312. See Peskoe, supra note 275, at 16–17, 24 (discussing FERC’s authority to
ground decisions in expectations about expected future policy choices).
313. Clean Energy Standard: REC and ZEC Purchases from NYSERDA,
NYSERDA, https://perma.cc/QVC9-89VC.
314. Id.
315. Auction Results: Allowance Prices and Volumes (by Auction), RGGI,
https://perma.cc/V4R8-VVTE (indicating that, in Auction 34, held on December 7, 2016, carbon dioxide allowances sold for $3.55).
316. The EIA estimates that natural-gas-fired generation emits, on average, 1.22
pounds of carbon dioxide per kWh and bituminous-coal-fired generation
emits 2.07 pounds of carbon dioxide per kWh. See EIA, supra note 152. We
multiplied these figures by the RGGI auction clearing price to determine the
carbon price faced by generators.
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significant volume of fossil-fueled generation with energy efficiency and zero-emitting resources, which will, in turn, require expanding transmission capacity and making changes to bulk power
system operations. Planning must begin now if New York and
NYISO are to minimize the impact of these changes on electric system reliability while ensuring continued availability of plentiful
supplies of electricity at reasonable rates.
FERC has previously taken steps to improve electric system
planning, including adopting Order 1000, which requires Transmission Owners “to develop a regional transmission plan that reflects the evaluation of whether alternative regional solutions may
be more efficient or cost-effective” than local solutions.317 Specifically, Order 1000 requires Transmission Owners seeking to develop new transmission facilities to participate in a regional planning process which:
1. considers “transmission needs driven by public policy requirements established by” enacted statutes or regulations,318 and allows for consideration of transmission
needs driven by public policy objectives not codified in existing laws;319 and
2. gives “comparable consideration” to transmission and nontransmission alternatives—a category that includes storage, energy efficiency, distributed energy resources, and
demand response.320
Adoption of a NYISO carbon price reflective of state-level public policies would promote the same goals as Order 1000, albeit on
different legal grounds. Specifically, it would embody New York’s
policies with respect to climate change mitigation and adaptation,
including those not yet codified, in a way that directly informs bulk
power system planning—a potentially important corrective, given

317. Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,845
(Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 1000].
318. Id.
319. Id. at 49,878; see also Shelly Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 481–86 (2015) (describing examples of planning
pursuant to Order 1000 that fail to realize that Order’s stated aims).
320. Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,868.
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the ambition of New York’s 40 by 30 goal321 and the fact that uncodified policies are often ignored by transmission operators in
their planning processes.322
Similarly, a wholesale carbon price would also push in the
same direction as Order 1000’s “comparable consideration” requirement. This requirement was intended to ensure that investments in transmission—which are always costly and long-lived—
are not made before due consideration is given to potentially more
efficient and cost-effective alternative approaches.323 Despite this,
however, regional transmission planning efforts still typically focus on how to develop transmission and largely or completely ignore the question of whether non-transmission alternatives might
contribute to a more optimal solution, either by supplanting transmission facilities or enabling more cost-effective routes or combinations of transmission and alternatives.324 The state’s “Reforming the Energy Vision” initiative, adopted to further progress
towards the 40 by 30 goal, includes support for energy efficiency,
distributed generation, and other non-transmission alternatives.325 The NYPSC is working to ensure that retail electricity

321. N.Y. STATE ENERGY PLANNING BD., supra note 1, at 111 (stating that goal of
energy efficiency reductions of 600 trillion BTU in buildings would mean a
twenty-three percent reduction by 2030 from a 2012 baseline).
322. See, e.g., WEISSMAN & WEBB, supra note 258, at 36 (finding that “[w]hile
some transmission operators have voluntarily elected to consider additional
policy objectives not codified in existing laws and regulations, most have
not”). But see CDP, supra note 242, at 40 (indicating that some electric utilities have begun considering “the potential future policy and regulatory risk
associated with carbon [dioxide] emissions” in their planning processes).
323. Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,851–53; see also Scott Hempling, ‘NonTransmission Alternatives’: FERC’s ‘Comparable Consideration’ Needs Correction, ELEC. POL’Y 9 (2013), https://perma.cc/SKR5-TY8S (“It is not prudent for a public utility not to consider all feasible alternatives. The costs
that emerge from an imprudent process—one that ignores alternatives—
cannot be reasonable costs.”).
324. Welton, supra note 319, at 481–86 (illustrating with examples how Order
1000 has failed to realize its stated aims); Interview by Marta Monti with
Allen Gleckner, Humphrey Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Minn. 10–11 (June
16, 2015), https://perma.cc/LRT5-HPCB (“[A] problem with transmission
planning nation-wide is how non-transmission alternatives are looked at . . .
. Right now there are a few different wonky reasons why it’s not being fully
looked at on a level playing field with the transmission proposals.”).
325. Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy
Vision: Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and Implementation
Plan, Case No. 14-M-0101 at 10–11 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 26, 2015).
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markets operate in a way that is consistent with and furthers investment in these alternatives.326 A wholesale carbon price would
reflect this purpose by pushing stakeholders to more thoroughly
examine non-transmission alternatives.327
3. Carbon Prices Aligned to Arguments 1 and 2
Parts 1 and 2 above present various arguments in support of
carbon pricing in NYISO. Design of the pricing scheme and the
pricing level depends heavily on which of those arguments NYISO
relies upon:
• Argument 1(a), which emphasizes the need to internalize
carbon externalities to improve wholesale market competitiveness, logically corresponds to a carbon price based on
the SCC. As explained in Part A, the SCC is an approximation of the damage to social welfare resulting from carbon dioxide emissions. Its use would, therefore, ensure
that the external costs of emissions from fossil fuel generation are reflected in electricity prices, which, in our view,
is necessary to level the playing field for non-fossil generators and thus improve the functioning of wholesale markets.
• Argument 1(b), which focuses on the costs fossil fuel generation imposes on the electric system, e.g., in terms of reduced reliability, would not justify adoption of a carbon
price based on the SCC. As the SCC is a measure of the
economy-wide cost of carbon dioxide emissions, its use
would overstate the reliability and other electric system
costs of such emissions. We are not aware of an analysis
that traces cost causation from generators to end-users,
but we are confident that it could be done by examining
carefully the effects on reliability and resiliency of particular fuel and facility types.328
326. Id.
327. Cf. NYISO, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES ROADMAP FOR NEW YORK’S
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS (DRAFT) (2016), https://perma.cc/Y87UUVBG.
328. For a discussion of service reliability studies, see MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN ET
AL., ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., UPDATED VALUE OF
SERVICE RELIABILITY ESTIMATES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY CUSTOMERS IN THE
U.S. (2015), https://perma.cc/6M6Y-6KDA.
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Argument 2, which emphasizes the need to improve shortand long-run electric system planning, would arguably justify use of a price derived from the SCC as the basis for a
scheme that harmonizes various state-level public policies.
Underlying this argument is a concern that current and
future state policies aimed at addressing climate change
will necessitate a shift away from carbon-intensive generation. NYISO’s adoption of a carbon pricing scheme derived from the SCC, which is already a touchstone for New
York public policy, would help ensure that market participants plan for that shift now.

B. A NYISO Carbon Price Would Not Be Unduly
Discriminatory
FERC cannot approve a utility tariff that it finds to be unduly
discriminatory in the sense of “grant[ing] any undue preference or
advantage to any person or subject[ing] any person to any undue
prejudice or disadvantage or . . . maintain[ing] any unreasonable
difference in rates.”329 This was historically assessed on a customer-specific basis, with FERC requiring utilities to offer like
rates, calculated on a cost-of-service basis, to all similarly situated
customers.330 More recently, with the shift to market-based rates,
FERC has undertaken a broader inquiry, focusing on whether market conditions are discriminatory. As Eisen has observed,
“[i]nstead of judging whether an individual firm’s action is . . . discriminatory, [FERC] decides whether features of the wholesale
markets’ operation contribute to [this] effect.”331
Some commentators have suggested that a carbon pricing
scheme could be viewed as discriminatory.332 Peskoe, for example,
has noted that opponents of carbon pricing may argue that it favors
some generators over others.333 We recognize, as Peskoe does, that
carbon pricing will necessarily treat generators differently based

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

16 U.S.C. § 824d(b).
Eisen, supra note 275, at 1812.
Id.
See, e.g., Peskoe, supra note 275, at 26.
Id. (stating that “opponents of carbon adder may argue that an adder would
be contrary to FERC’s long-standing policy of not favoring particular types
of electric generation”).
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on their emissions profiles.334 This is because, while the same carbon price would be applied to all generating units, regardless of
technology, the resulting carbon fee would differ based on each
unit’s emissions.335 Some may, therefore, view carbon pricing as
supporting renewable generating units at the expense of fossil fuel
power plants. That is not necessarily the case, however. Some renewable generators (e.g., using biofuels) produce emissions which
would be subject to carbon pricing. Those generators would face a
higher carbon fee than fossil fuel plants with low or zero emissions
(e.g., clean coal facilities).
Even though it applies different fees to each generator, in our
view, carbon pricing does not violate the prohibition on undue discrimination in the FPA. Differential treatment is permitted under
the FPA if FERC “offer[s] a valid reason for the disparity . . .
[which is related] to the achievement of permissible policy
goals.”336 With respect to a carbon price, NYISO may argue that
disparate treatment of low- and high-carbon generators is necessary to improve the functioning of wholesale electricity markets, a
long-accepted policy goal. A similar argument, albeit in a different
context, was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Wisconsin Public Power, Inc. v. FERC
(“WPP”).337 That case involved a FERC decision exempting certain
transmission providers from compliance with MISO’s OATT on the
basis that they provided services under contracts predating
MISO’s formation.338 The court noted that FERC’s decision “was in
some loose sense discriminatory,” as the exempt providers were not
subject to certain fees levied on others and could schedule services
on short notice with greater flexibility.339 The court concluded,
however, that the discrimination was not undue, as it was necessary to solve a specific problem in the market, stating:

334. Id. (noting that “[a] carbon adder . . . is essentially a payment from owners
of emitting resources to owners of emission-free resources. By definition,
such a fee discriminates. Whether that discrimination is ‘undue’ is a separate matter.”).
335. See supra Part VI.
336. Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
337. Wis. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
338. Id. at 249.
339. Id. at 274.
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MISO’s development was complicated by the existence of several
hundred pre-existing bilateral contracts between its transmission
owners and other utilities. These long-term contracts, known as
grandfathered agreements (GFAs), obligated the transmission
owners to provide transmission service under terms and rates that
were inconsistent with the OATT. . . . The tension between GFA
terms and practices on the one hand and the MISO Tariff on the
other hand was from the very beginning a “fundamental problem
in the proposed design and operation” of MISO. . . . [The] discrimination [complained of] was inherent in the solution to [that] problem.340

A carbon price would also address a fundamental problem in
the design and operation of wholesale electricity markets. As explained above, the problem arises from the failure of markets to
accurately value low- and high-carbon sources of electricity, which
impairs competition. This problem is particularly acute in NYISO
markets, which have been further distorted by state laws that impose diverse carbon prices on some but not all market participants.
Extending carbon pricing to all participants would remedy this distortion. To the extent that this results in differential treatment of
participants, it is “inherent in the solution” to the problem at hand
and, thus, not undue under the test articulated in WPP.
This conclusion is further supported by the fact that those benefiting from the extension of carbon pricing account for a relatively
small share of generation. The key beneficiaries of carbon pricing
are, of course, zero-carbon generating units. Most of those units
already have their zero-carbon attributes valued through New
York’s CES. The remaining zero-carbon generators serve a relatively small share of electricity load. This is significant as, in WPP,
the court emphasized that the limited extent of discrimination suggested it was not undue.341 In that case, those benefiting from the
discriminatory practices accounted for approximately ten percent
of peak load.342

340. Id. at 249, 270, 274.
341. Id. at 274 (noting that “the extent of discrimination was relatively small and
not ‘undue’”).
342. Id. at 270.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In response to federal and state policies aimed at limiting the
electricity sector’s carbon dioxide emissions, several ISO/RTOs
have commenced reviews into whether and how to price carbon in
wholesale energy markets. With some notable exceptions, emissions are not currently priced in wholesale markets but rather
treated as externalities. This results in a mismatch between the
price and cost of fossil fuel generation, which leads to higher levels
of such generation than are socially optimal. To correct this market
failure and equalize prices with costs, an ISO/RTO could include a
carbon fee reflecting each generator’s emissions profile in its bids
into the wholesale market. By causing high-emitting generators,
such as coal- and oil-fired units, to be dispatched less frequently,
this would provide an incentive for investment in cleaner generating options and in non-transmission alternatives like energy efficiency or demand response.
Although the carbon pricing scheme we propose is conceptually simple, its implementation would raise numerous and complex
issues. In the New York context, for example, any carbon pricing
scheme proposed by NYISO would have to be integrated with
RGGI. Thus, after determining a carbon fee for each generator—a
difficult task in itself—NYISO would need to adjust that fee to exclude the cost of RGGI allowances. NYISO would also need to resolve whether the fee should accommodate or displace Tier 3 of the
CES.
NYISO’s proposed carbon pricing scheme would be subject to
review by FERC. This Article argued that a carbon price could be
justified as a means of improving the functioning of wholesale markets to ensure just and reasonable rates. While we view this as
fully consistent with the law and with long-standing FERC practice, we note that it would push the boundaries of what has been
done in the past. A more modest approach would see carbon pricing
used solely to reflect and harmonize state-level policies aimed at
reducing electricity sector emissions.
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